

## Affirming Identities in 20th- and 21st-Century Britain

R. Bethmont



Documents

# Lloyd George on the Lords' rejection of the 'People's Budget', 3 December 1909

Speech delivered in London outside the National Liberal Club

They have thrown out the Budget, and, in doing so, have initiated one of the greatest, gravest, and most promising struggles of the time. Liberty owes as much to the foolhardiness of its foes as it does to the sapience and wisdom of its friends. I wish for no better illustration of that than this incident.

5 Here, for years, for generations, Liberal statesmen have striven to bring to an issue these great forces. Their Bills were mutilated, torn, and devitalised by this machine, and they were never able to bring the cause to any sort of decision. It has been done at last, and I am proud that I have had a small

10 10 share in it. At last the cause between the Peers and the people has been set down for trial in the great assize of the people, and the verdict will soon come. The Assembly which has delayed, denied, and mutilated justice for so long has at last been brought to justice.

15 Well, now, we are on the eve of a General Election, which will decide this great question. [Applause]

20 20 [Applause] there will be one great dominant question submitted to the electors, one that will absorb all others. What is that? [A voice: "The House of Lords."] That's it – the question which was put by the Prime Minister in his great speech yesterday. Here are you a nation of nearly 45 millions, one of the greatest nations the world has ever seen, a nation whose proficiency

25 in the art of government is unrivalled, a nation which has no superior in commerce or in industry. It has established the greatest merchant fleets that ever rode the waves. It has got the greatest international commerce in the world. It has founded the greatest and the most extensive empire the world has ever witnessed.

30 30 And yet we are told that this great nation, with such a record of splendid achievements in the past and in the present, is unfit to make its own laws, is unfit to control its own finance, and that it is to be placed as if it were a nation of children or lunatics, under the tutelage and guardianship of some other body – and what body? Who are the guardians of this mighty people? Who are they? With all respect – I shall have to make exceptions; but I am speaking of them as a whole, and I shall come to the analysis later on. They are men who have neither the training, the qualifications, nor the experience which would fit them for such a gigantic task. They are men whose sole

35 35 qualification – speaking in the main, and for the majority of them – they are simply men whose sole qualification is that they are the first born of persons who had just as little qualifications as themselves.

40 40 To invite this Imperial race; this, the greatest commercial nation in the world; this, the nation that has taught the world the principles of self-government and liberty; to invite this nation itself to sign the decree that declares it unfit to govern itself without the guardianship of such people, is an insult which I hope will be flung back with ignominy. This is a great issue. It is this: Is this nation to be a free nation and to become a freer one, or is it for all time to be shackled and tethered by tariffs and trusts and monopolies and privileges? That is the issue, and no Liberal will shirk it.

David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, London, Odhams Press, 1938.

# CURTAILING THE POWER OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS

**From Asquith's speech introducing resolutions prior to the Parliament Bill, 29 March 1910 (Hansard, 5<sup>th</sup> series, XV, cols 1180-1182).**

*In a Commons debate, Asquith introduces three government resolutions to deal with the absolute veto of the House of Lords.*

I am sorry to have detained the House so long in dealing with the details of these Resolutions. We put them forward to deal with the emergency which confronts us, not as purporting to be a full or adequate solution of the whole problem, or, as exhausting the policy of the Government. We put them forward as the first and indispensable step to the emancipation of  
5 the House of Commons, and to rescue from something like paralysis the principles of popular government. Further, we put them forward as a demand, sanctioned as we believe by a large majority of the representatives of the people chosen at the recent General Election, themselves representing a large majority of the electorate. Fundamental changes in this country, as nothing illustrates more clearly than this controversy, are slow to bring into effect. There was  
10 a story current of the last Parliament, which in this connection bears repetition. It was told of a new Member of the then House of Commons that in 1906 he witnessed for the first time the ceremony of opening Parliament. He saw gathered in the other Chamber at one end the King sitting on his throne, at the other end Mr. Speaker standing at the Bar. In between there was that scene of subdued but stately splendour, bringing and making alive to the eye and the  
15 imagination the unbroken course of centuries during which we alone here, of all the peoples of the world have been able to reconcile and harmonise the traditions of the past, the needs of the present, the hopes and aspirations of the future. He was a man of very advanced views, and as he gazed upon that unique and impressive spectacle, felt constrained to mutter to a neighbour, a man of like opinions with himself, "This will take a lot of abolishing." So it will.  
20 It was a very shrewd observation. But I am not sure that he had mastered the real lesson of the occasion. So far as outward vision goes, one would seem, no doubt, in the presence of such a ceremony as that, to be transplanted to the days of the Plantagenets. The framework is the same; the setting is almost the same. The very figures of the picture—King, Peers, Judges, Commons—are the same, at any rate, in name. But that external and superficial identity  
25 masks a series of the greatest transformations that have been recorded in the constitutional experience of mankind. The Sovereign sits there on the Throne of Queen Elizabeth, who, as history tells us, on one occasion, at the end of a single Session, opposed the Royal Veto to no less than forty-eight out of ninety-one Bills which had received the assent of both Houses of Parliament. That Royal Veto, then and for long afterwards, an active and potent enemy of  
30 popular rights, is literally as dead as Queen Anne. Yes, Sir; and has the Monarchy suffered? Has the Monarchy suffered? There is not a man among us, in whatever quarter of this House he sits, who does not know the Crown of this Realm, with its hereditary succession, its Prerogatives adjusted from generation to generation to the needs of the people and the calls of the Empire, is held by our Gracious Sovereign by a far surer tenure than ever fell to the lot  
35 of any of his Tudor or Stuart ancestors. The liberties again of the Commons, which you, Sir, only a month ago once more claimed and asserted at the same Bar, in time-honoured phrases which carry us back to the days when those liberties were in jeopardy from the Crown—the liberties of the Commons, slowly and patiently won, in these days newly threatened and invaded—not, indeed, through the Crown, but from another quarter—are only in danger if,  
40 unlike our forefathers here, we refuse to take the necessary steps to make them safe. But there is one factor in the Constitution which, while everything else has changed, remains, sterilised in its development, possessing and exercising power without authority, still a standing menace and obstacle to progressive legislation and popular government. The absolute Veto of the Lords must follow the Veto of the Crown before the road can be clear for the advent of  
45 full-grown and unfettered democracy.

# THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LABOUR PARTY

## AS ADOPTED BY THE PARTY CONFERENCE HELD IN LONDON ON FEBRUARY 21, 1918

### 1. NAME

The Labour Party.

### 2. MEMBERSHIP

The Labour Party shall consist of all its affiliated organisations<sup>1</sup> together with those men and women who are individual members of a Local Labour Party and who subscribe to the Constitution and Programme of the Party.

### 3. PARTY OBJECTS

National

- (a) To organise and maintain in Parliament and in the country a Political Labour Party, and to ensure the establishment of a Local Labour Party in every County Constituency and every Parliamentary Borough, with suitable divisional organisation in the separate constituencies of Divided Boroughs.
- (b) To co-operate with the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, or other Kindred Organisations, in joint political or other action in harmony with the Party Constitution and Standing Orders.
- (c) To give effect as far as may be practicable to the principles from time to time approved by the Party Conference.
- (d) To secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service.
- (e) Generally to promote the Political, Social, and Economic Emancipation of the People, and more particularly of those who depend directly upon their own exertions by hand or by brain for the means of life.

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<sup>1</sup> Trade Unions, Socialist Societies, Co-operative Societies, Trades Councils, and Local Labour Parties.

...

## 5. THE PARTY CONFERENCE

(1) The work of the Party shall be under the direction and control of the Party Conference, which shall itself be subject to the Constitution and Standing Orders of the Party. The Party Conference shall meet regularly once in each year, and also at such other times as it may be convened by the National Executive.

(2) The Party Conference shall be constituted as follows: —

(a) Trade Unions and other societies affiliated to the Party may send one delegate for each thousand members on which fees are paid.

(b) Local Labour Party delegates may be either men or women resident or having a place of business in the constituency they represent, and shall be appointed as follows: —

In Borough and County Constituencies returning one Member to Parliament, the Local Labour Party may appoint one delegate.

In undivided Boroughs returning two Members, two delegates may be appointed.

...

An additional woman delegate may be appointed for each constituency in which the number of affiliated and individual women members exceeds 500.

...

## 8. AFFILIATION FEES

(1) Trade Unions, Socialist Societies, Co-operative Societies, and other organisations directly affiliated to the Party ... shall pay 2d. per member per annum to the Central Party Funds with a minimum of 30s.

## THE BEVERIDGE REPORT AND THE WELFARE STATE

William Beveridge trained as a lawyer but came to prominence during the Liberal government of 1906 - 1914 when he was asked to advise David Lloyd George on old age pensions and national insurance. When, in 1941, the government commissioned a report into the ways that Britain should be rebuilt after World War Two, Beveridge was an obvious choice to take charge. He published his report in 1942 and recommended that the government should find ways of fighting the five 'Giant Evils' of 'Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness'.

In 1945, the Labour Party defeated Winston Churchill's Conservative Party in the general election. The new prime minister, Clement Attlee, announced he would introduce the welfare state outlined in the 1942 Beveridge Report. This included the establishment of a National Health Service in 1948 with free medical treatment for all. A national system of benefits was also introduced to provide 'social security' so that the population would be protected from the 'cradle to the grave'. The new system was partly built on the national insurance scheme set up by Lloyd George in 1911. People in work still had to make contributions each week, as did employers, but the benefits provided were now much greater.

(From BBC Website, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic\\_figures/beveridge\\_william.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/beveridge_william.shtml))

The Beveridge report was given a lot of attention by the press and by the British public as soon as it was released in 1942. An opinion poll at the time estimated that 95 % of the population had heard of the report, approved of it, and hoped it would be implemented.



## William Beveridge, *Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services, 1942.*

There are some who will say that pursuit of security as defined in this Report, that is to say income security, is a wholly inadequate aim. Their view is not merely admitted but asserted in the Report itself. The Plan for Social Security is put forward as part of a general programme of social policy. It is one part only of an attack upon five giant evils: upon the physical Want with which it is directly concerned, upon Disease which often causes that Want and brings many other troubles in its train, upon Ignorance which no democracy can afford among its citizens, upon the Squalor which arises mainly through haphazard distribution of industry and population, and upon the Idleness which destroys wealth and corrupts men, whether they are well fed or not, when they are idle. In seeking security not merely against physical want, but against all these evils in all their forms, and in showing that security can be combined with freedom and enterprise and responsibility of the individual for his own life, the British community and those who in other lands have inherited the British tradition have a vital service to render to human progress. ...

There are yet others who will say that, however desirable it may appear to reconstruct social insurance or to make other plans for a better world of peace, all such concerns must now be put on one side, so that Britain may concentrate upon the urgent tasks of war. There is no need to spend words today in emphasising the urgency or the difficulty of the task that faces the British people and their Allies. Only by surviving victoriously in the present struggle can they enable freedom and happiness and kindliness to survive in the world. Only by obtaining from every individual citizen his maximum of effort, concentrated upon the purposes of war, can they hope for early victory. This does not alter three facts: that the purpose of victory is to live into a better world than the old world; that each individual citizen is more likely to concentrate upon his war effort if he feels that his Government will be ready in time with plans for that better world; that, if these plans are to be ready in time, they must be made now.

Statement of a reconstruction policy by a nation at war is statement of the uses to which that nation means to put victory, when victory is achieved. In a war which many nations must wage together as whole-hearted allies, if they are to win victory, such a statement of the uses of victory may be vital. This was recognised by the leaders of the democracies east and west of the Atlantic in putting their hands to a charter which, in general terms, set out the nature of the world which they desired to establish after the war. The Atlantic Charter has since then been signed on behalf of all the United Nations. The fifth clause of the charter declares the desire of the American and the British leaders "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security". The proposals of this Report are designed as a practical contribution towards the achievement of the social security which is named in the closing words. The proposals cover ground which must be covered, in one way or another, in translating the words of the Atlantic Charter into deeds. They represent, not an attempt by one nation to gain for its citizens advantages at the cost of their fellow fighters in a common cause, but a contribution to that common cause. They are concerned not with increasing the wealth of the British people, but with so distributing whatever wealth is available to them in total, as to deal first with first things, with essential physical needs. They are a sign of the belief that the object of government in peace and in war is not the glory of rulers or of races, but the happiness of the common man. That is a belief which, through all differences in forms of government, unites not only the democracies whose leaders first put their hands to the Atlantic Charter, but those democracies and all their Allies. It unites the United Nations and divides them from their enemies.

## THE POST-WAR LABOUR GOVERNMENT

*The following text is taken from Clement Attlee's memoirs. Attlee reflects on the Labour government he led as Prime Minister between 1945 and 1951.*

The Labour Party came to power with a well-defined policy worked out over many years. It had been set out very clearly in our Election Manifesto and we were determined to carry it out. Its ultimate objective was the creation of a society based on social justice, and, in our view, this could only be attained by bringing under public ownership and control the main factors in the economic system. Nationalisation was not an end in itself but an essential element in achieving the ends which we sought. Controls were desirable not for their own sake but because they were necessary in order to gain freedom from the economic power of the owners of capital. A juster distribution of wealth was not a policy designed to soak the rich or to take revenge, but because a society with gross inequalities of wealth and opportunity is fundamentally unhealthy.

It had always been our practice, in accord with the natural genius of the British people, to work empirically. We were not afraid of compromise and partial solutions. We knew that mistakes would be made and that advance would be often by trial and error. We realised that the application of socialist principles in a country such as Britain with a peculiar economic structure based on international trade required great flexibility.

We were also well aware of the especially difficult situation of the country resulting from the great life and death struggle from which we had emerged victorious. But, in our view, this did not make change in the socialist direction less necessary. On the contrary, it was clear that there could be no return to past conditions. The old pattern was worn out and it was for us to weave the new. Thus, the kind of reproach levelled at us by Churchill, that instead of uniting the country by a programme of social reform on the lines of the Beveridge Report, we were following a course dictated by social prejudice or theory, left us completely unmoved. We had not been elected to try to patch up an old system but to make something new. Our policy was not a reformed capitalism but progress toward a democratic socialism.

Clement Attlee, *As It Happened*, London, Heinemann, 1954.

**Margaret Thatcher – Panorama Interview - June 1987**  
**TRANSCRIPT**

**Sir Robin Day**

... many Tory Cabinet Ministers you have sacked have been in the tradition of Toryism known as One-Nation Toryism, started by Disraeli followed on by Butler, Macmillan, and others. Under Thatcherism—your critics say—the nation is not one nation but a divided nation.

**Prime Minister**

Let me answer that very deeply because I feel very strongly about it. The greatest division this nation has ever seen were the conflicts of trade unions towards the end of a Labour Government—terrible conflicts. That trade union movement then was under the diktat of trade union bosses, some of whom are still there. They used their power against their members. They made them come out on strike when they didn't want to. They loved secondary picketing. They went and demonstrated outside companies where there was no dispute whatsoever, and sometimes closed them down. They were acting as they were later in the coal strike, before my whole trade union laws were through, this Government. They were out to use their power to hold the nation to ransom, to stop power from getting to the whole of manufacturing industry, to damage people's jobs, to stop power from getting to every house in the country, power, heat and light to every housewife, every child, every school, every pensioner. You want division; you want conflict; you want hatred. There it was! It was that which Thatcherism—if you call it that—tried to stop. Not by arrogance, but by giving power to the ordinary, decent, honourable, trade union member who didn't want to go on strike. By giving power to him over the Scargills of this world.

That is one conflict. That has gone. Another one. I believe passionately that people have a right, by their own efforts, to benefit their own families, so we have taken down taxation. It doesn't matter to me who you are or what your background is. If you want to use your own efforts to work harder—yes, I am with you all the way, whether it is unskilled effort or whether it is skilled, we have taken the income tax down.

The third thing. All my predecessors—yes, I agree, Disraeli; yes, Harold Macmillan—I would say I am right in their tradition. It was Disraeli's one nation. We have had an increase in home ownership—the heart of the family under this Government.

**Sir Robin Day**

Can I ask another question, Prime Minister?

**Prime Minister**

You asked me the most fundamental question.

**Sir Robin Day**

We are not having a party political broadcast, we are having an interview so I have to ask some questions occasionally.

**Prime Minister**

You asked, what I know you call the gut question. Right. It's gone for the jugular. Let me finish it. More home ownership; far more share ownership; far more savings in building society accounts. This is what is building one nation—as every earner becomes a shareholder, as more and more people own their homes. No. We are getting rid of the divisions. We are replacing conflict with co-operation. We are building one nation through wider property-owning democracy.

Please go ahead

# Margaret Thatcher on Democratic Socialism


No theory of government was ever given a fairer test or a more prolonged experiment in a democratic country than democratic socialism received in Britain. Yet it was a miserable failure in every respect. Far from reversing the slow relative decline of Britain *vis-à-vis* its main industrial competitors, it accelerated it. We fell further behind them, until by 1979 we were widely dismissed as 'the sick man of Europe'. The relative worsening of our economic position was disguised by the rising affluence of the West as a whole. We, among others, could hardly fail to benefit from the long economic expansion of the post-war western world led by the United States. But if we never had it so good, others – like Germany, France, Italy, Denmark – increasingly had it better. And, as the 1970s wore grimly on, we began to fail in absolute as well as relative terms.

Injections of monetary demand, which in the 1950s had produced a rise in real production and a fall in unemployment before causing a modest rise in prices, now went directly into high rates of inflation without so much as a blip on the charts for production and unemployment. State subsidies and direction of investment achieved progressively more inefficient industries and ever lower returns on capital. Laws giving protective immunity to the trade unions at the turn of the century were now abused to protect restrictive practices and over-manning, to underpin strikes, and to coerce workers into joining unions and participating in industrial action against their better judgement. Welfare benefits, distributed with little or no consideration of their effects on behaviour, encouraged illegitimacy, facilitated the breakdown of families, and replaced incentives favouring work and self-reliance with perverse encouragement for idleness and cheating. The final illusion – that state intervention would promote social harmony and solidarity or, in Tory language, 'One Nation' – collapsed in the 'winter of discontent' when the dead went unburied, critically ill patients were turned away from hospitals by pickets, and the prevailing social mood was one of snarling envy and motiveless hostility. To cure the British disease with socialism was like trying to cure leukaemia with leeches.


Another approach was needed – and for international reasons as well as domestic ones. Britain's weakened economic position meant that its international role was bound to be cramped and strained as well. Our most painful experience of the country's reduced circumstances was the failure of the Suez expedition in 1956. This was the result of political and economic weakness rather than military failure, because the Government withdrew a victorious force from the Canal Zone in response to a 'run on the pound' encouraged by the US Government. Whatever the details of this defeat, however, it entered the British soul and distorted our perspective on Britain's place in the world.

We developed what might be called the 'Suez syndrome': having previously exaggerated our power, we now exaggerated our impotence. Military and diplomatic successes such as the war in Borneo – which preserved the independence of former British colonies against Indonesian subversion, helped to topple the anti-western dictator, Sukarno, and thus altered the long-term balance of power in Asia in our interest – were either dismissed as trivial or ignored altogether. Defeats, which in reality were the results of avoidable misjudgement, such as the retreat from the Gulf in 1970, were held to be the inevitable consequences of British decline. And comic opera enterprises, such as Harold Wilson's 'invasion' of Anguilla in March 1969 (for once, 'police action' seems the right term) were gleefully seized upon to illustrate the reality of reduced British power. The truth – that Britain was a middle-ranking power, given unusual influence by virtue of its historical distinction, skilled diplomacy and versatile military forces, but greatly weakened by economic decline – seemed too complex for sophisticated people to grasp. They were determined to think themselves much weaker and more contemptible than was in fact the case, and refused all comfort to the contrary.

## THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1920




## THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 1967



## BRITISH OVERSEAS DEPENDENT TERRITORIES, 1993

On 1 January 1993 there were fourteen British dependent territories, the last remnants of an Empire on which "the sun never set". Their total population was six million. The most populous, Hong Kong, with a population of 5,800,000, is to revert to China on 1 July 1997



© Martin Gilbert, 1993


## BRITAIN'S PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS, 1989

**Key:** £65,880 million value of British exports to the countries shown (in millions of pounds)

£88,244 million cost of imports to Britain from the countries shown (in millions of pounds)

In 1989 European Community countries accounted for seven of Britain's top ten export markets, and six of the ten main suppliers of goods to Britain. Since 1981 the United States has been the largest single market for British goods, and the Federal Republic of Germany (since 1990 united Germany) has been Britain's largest supplier of imported goods. This map shows the top ten markets, and the top ten suppliers, in 1989. In 1990 Britain's trade deficit stood at £14,000 million

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Draft of the Balfour Declaration, 1926  
Cabinet Papers, National Archives

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C A B I N E T.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE.

COMMITTEE ON INTER-IMPERIAL RELATIONS.

Note by the Lord President of the Council.

I attach for the information of my colleagues some draft paragraphs relating to the position and mutual relations of Great Britain and the Dominions, which have been provisionally accepted by the Committee of Prime Ministers and Heads of Delegations, over which I have the honour to preside. This draft has been arrived at as the result of difficult and prolonged discussions.

A.J.B.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

15th November, 1926.

The Committee are of opinion that nothing would be gained by attempting to define the Constitution of the British Empire. Its widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution; while, considered as a whole, it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organisation which now exists or has ever yet been tried.

There is, however, one most important element in it which, from a strictly constitutional point of view, has now, as regards all vital matters, reached its full development; - we refer to the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions. Their position and mutual relation may be readily defined. They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

A foreigner endeavouring to understand the true character of the British Empire by the aid of this formula alone might be tempted to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual co-operation easy.

Such a criticism, however, completely ignores the historic situation. The rapid evolution of the Overseas Dominions during the last fifty years has involved many complicated adjustments of old political machinery to changing conditions. The tendency towards equality of status was both right and inevitable. Geographical and other conditions made this impossible of attainment by the way of federation.

The only alternative was by the way of autonomy; and along this road it has been steadily sought. Every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever.

But no account, however accurate, of the negative relations in which Great Britain and the Dominions stand to each other can do more than express a portion of the truth. The British Empire is not founded solely or mainly upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and progress are among its objects. Aspects of all these great themes have been discussed at the present Conference: excellent results have been thereby obtained. And though every Dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.

Equality of status, so far as Britain and the Dominions are concerned, is thus the root principle governing our inter-Imperial relations. But the principles of equality and similarity, appropriate to status, cannot be universally extended to function. Here we require something more than immutable dogmas. For example, to deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence we require also flexible machinery:- machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world. This subject also has occupied the attention of etc. .... (This is intended to supply (if necessary) a bridge to all the other subjects on which the Conference has been engaged.)

A.J.B.

...

Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference  
Held in London in January and February 1956.

Cabinet Papers, National Archives

IV. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS

28. On the subject of the machinery of Government relating to the administration of financial and economic affairs, we agree that the responsibility for all financial matters, including foreign exchange, at present discharged by the Financial Secretary, should be transferred at once to a Malayan Minister of Finance. We recognise that, during the interim period, the United Kingdom will possess a continuing interest in the mechanism of financial control in the Federation in order to be satisfied that the expenditure of money made available from United Kingdom funds is properly controlled, but we are satisfied that there are no objections on financial grounds to this proposal. We are also agreed that a Ministry of Commerce and Industry should be set up to take over some of the functions at present exercised by the Minister for Economic Affairs, which title would lapse.

29. We recognise that ultimate responsibility for policy will rest with the Executive Council, and we welcome the proposal to establish, under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister, an Economic Committee of the Executive Council, charged with the responsibility of coordinating economic policy and determining priorities, in the belief that such a Committee will greatly assist and strengthen the work of government.

30. We had a full and frank discussion of the Federation's position in the Sterling Area. The Malayan Delegation indicated that it was the view of their Government that membership of the Sterling Area was to the common advantage of the Federation and the other members and that it was their intention to remain in it after attaining full self-government. There was general recognition by the United Kingdom representatives of the importance of the Federation's contribution to the strength of the Sterling Area through the direct earnings of dollars from rubber and tin.

31. We discussed the question of responsibility for the Federation's foreign exchange policy with particular reference to dollar imports. We recognise that the existing arrangements for consultation between the Government of the Federation and Her Majesty's Government have on the whole worked well in practice. There was a general discussion on the common problems of the Sterling Area and it was agreed that, so long as the problem of the balance of payments of the area as a whole remained, it would be necessary for the Government of the Federation to continue to exercise restraint in its dollar expenditure in conformity with the policy generally followed by the Sterling Area. We agree that the responsibility for applying this policy in the Federation rests with the Federation Government and that the Federation Government will continue to consult with Her Majesty's Government so that it can act in full knowledge of Sterling Area problems and the United Kingdom can be fully informed of the special problems of the Federation.

32. In view of the Federation's participation in the Sterling Area and the importance of its trade to the Area's strength, it was agreed that the Federation Government must be able to assure the people of the Federation that the voice of their elected representatives would be heard in matters of Sterling Area policy. We agreed that, in order to achieve this, it was desirable that arrangements should be made for the Government of the Federation to send a delegate to all future meetings of Commonwealth Finance Ministers on a basis which would enable him to have full freedom of expression and full discretion at such Conferences in all matters which fall within the responsibility of the Federation Government. The Federation Delegation agreed not to press the matter of the precise constitutional status of the Federation's delegate at such Conferences further at the present time, but it was agreed that the Federation Government would be entitled to raise it again should occasion arise later.

33. We recognise the important part which overseas capital must continue to play in the economic and social development of Malaya. In this connection we think it desirable to draw attention to the statement in the Alliance Manifesto that it is their policy to attract overseas capital to Malaya. This was given more detailed expression in the High Commissioner's statement in the

Legislative Council on the 30th November, 1955, in which he stated that the Federation Government looked with confidence to the establishment of happy relationships and a full sense of partnership between a fully self-governing Malaya and overseas industry and enterprise genuinely interested in the development on sound lines of the country's productive resources. To this end it was, and would remain, their policy to encourage overseas investment, industry and enterprise to look to Malaya with every assurance of fair and considerate treatment and without fear of discrimination. The relevant extract from the High Commissioner's address is contained at Appendix F.

34. Regarding the future financial relationship between the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya, we agree that it is most important that the Federation should go forward to full self-government in circumstances which will give a fair assurance of its future financial stability. In this context, we recognise fully the vitally important position of the Federation in the world-wide struggle against communism and the fact that operations in the military sphere must be backed by a sound and vigorous programme of economic and social development.

35. During the interim period Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to help the Federation should it become clear that, having regard to the necessity for the Federation Government to make provision for an expanded programme of economic and social development and to the need to maintain reserves at the right level as a precaution against possible fluctuations in the prices of rubber and tin before the Federation's rubber replanting schemes bear fruit, there is a need for financial assistance from the United Kingdom towards the cost of the Emergency. To this end we agree that a meeting should be held as soon as possible between the United Kingdom and Federation Governments with a view to determining the necessity for such assistance.

36. It is recognised that the attainment of full self-government implies the principle of financial self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government recognise the common interest of both Governments in bringing the Emergency to an end. For this reason, if the Emergency has not been brought to an end by the time that full self-government and independence within the Commonwealth is attained, Her Majesty's Government will still be prepared to consider with the Federation Government whether the financial needs of the Federation would justify special assistance from Her Majesty's Government towards meeting the cost of the Emergency over and above the substantial assistance which will continue to be given through the forces and services provided by the United Kingdom to sustain the fight against the Communist terrorists.

37. In any event, substantial help will still be available from the United Kingdom after the attainment of full self-government within the Commonwealth, as follows:-

- (i) Apart from their continuing commitments in the Federation in respect of its external defence, Her Majesty's Government will maintain their undertaking to finance certain capital costs of expansion of the Federation Armed Forces in an agreed programme;
- (ii) Her Majesty's Government will at all times be ready to examine sympathetically with the Federation its borrowing needs on the London market in connection with its development plans;
- (iii) If, at the time when the Federation attains full self-government within the Commonwealth, there is any unspent balance of allocations made to the Federation under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, the approval of Parliament will be sought to enable an amount equivalent to any such balance to be made available to the Federation for development expenditure;
- (iv) Her Majesty's Government will stand by their undertaking to provide assistance, subject to the approval of Parliament in the form of a loan to the Federation to enable it to finance its contribution to the Tin Buffer Stock should it be unable to obtain the necessary loan finance from any other suitable source.

## Working towards the Independence of Singapore

In 1957 the British government oversaw the transition towards independence of its two most important South-Asian colonies: Malaya and Singapore (they became independent at the end of August). The independence of these colonies, however, was prepared so as to preserve British interests in the region as much as possible. The Cabinet paper below is from March 1957 and presents the conclusion of a Cabinet meeting after the Singapore delegation—in charge of the negotiations with the British government to move towards independence—objected to the British government's initial proposals about the conditions on which Britain would continue to be in control of Singapore's external defence policy after independence. This was a matter which also concerned neighbouring Malaya because the British naval base in Singapore, the most important East of Suez, would also serve to give military support to Malaya.

The British government's initial proposals had been that it would be the sole ultimate judge of what constituted an external defence matter after Singapore's independence. Deciding what constituted at any moment a matter of external defence was to be the privilege of the Internal Security Council which was made up of one Singapore representative, one Federation of Malaya representative and one British representative. In practice, the British government's initial proposals meant that the British representative on the Internal Security Council was to have an absolute veto on any majority decision taken by the Council.

The Singapore delegation considered that this gave too much power to Britain because an internal Singapore affair may ultimately escape the Singapore government if Britain pretexts that it was a matter of external defence. They therefore made counter-proposals.

This counter-proposals were aimed at preventing Britain from unduly vetoing the decisions made by the Singapore Internal Security Council on what constituted a matter of external defence (see text line 1 to 9 – you should ignore the bit of the text that comes before the red arrow). But to make sure that the Internal Security Council would not in its turn unduly prevent British control over legitimate foreign policy matters, the Singapore delegation also proposed a mechanism by which, if it could be proved that a particular matter was indeed to be classified as foreign defence, against the majority ruling of the Internal Security Council, the Queen's representative in Singapore (the successor of the Governor of colonial Singapore) would have the power to unilaterally make decisions that would have the force of law (see text line 9-20).

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*Printed for the Cabinet. March 1957*SECRET

Copy No. 40

C.C. (57)

27th Conclusions

## CABINET

*CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on Thursday, 28th March, 1957, at 10.30 p.m.*

## Present:

The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister.	The Right Hon. VISCOUNT KILMUIR, Lord Chancellor.
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal.	The Right Hon. PETER THORNEYCROFT, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. SELWYN LLOYD, Q.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.	The Right Hon. ALAN LENNOX-BOYD, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Right Hon. THE EARL OF HOME, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.	The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Sir DAVID ECCLES, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.	The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, Q.C., Minister of Education.
The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs.	Dr. The Right Hon. CHARLES HILL, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
The Right Hon. HAROLD WATKINSON, M.P., Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation.	

## Secretariat:

Mr. B. ST. J. TREND.  
Mr. H. O. HOOPER.

Singapore.  
(Previous  
Reference :  
C.C. (57) 15th  
Conclusions.  
Minute 3.)

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (57) 78) about the current negotiations on a new constitution for Singapore.

The Colonial Secretary said that he had been able to reach agreement with the Singapore delegation on all matters which the Cabinet had considered to be fundamental, with two exceptions. We had proposed that we should be entitled to determine unilaterally what questions could properly be dealt with by the Internal Security Council, and that the United Kingdom representative should be empowered to require The Queen's representative to reserve for Her Majesty's pleasure any legislation which appeared to him to affect our ability to discharge our responsibilities for external affairs and defence. In each instance the Singapore delegation had claimed that, if they were to concede these stipulations in the form in which we sought them, they would expose themselves to the charge that they had agreed to the perpetuation of Colonial rule. They had therefore proposed that it should be for the Internal Security Council itself to decide whether a matter in dispute was a matter of internal security with which the Council could properly deal, and that the power of the United Kingdom's representative to require legislation to be reserved for The Queen's pleasure should depend upon its being established, if necessary by a ruling of the Internal Security Council, that the issues involved were genuinely issues of defence and external affairs and not issues of internal security. In return for this proposed limitation of our power of veto they had offered to incorporate in the constitution additional sanctions compelling the Government of Singapore to meet any requirements of the United Kingdom Government which were shown to relate genuinely to defence and external affairs; and they had also proposed that, if the Government of Singapore failed to meet the obligations imposed on them either by a vote of the Internal Security Council or by a United Kingdom requirement in the field reserved to us, the United Kingdom representative should be empowered to require The Queen's representative to make an Order, having the force of law, to ensure that the obligations were met.

As a result of these counter-proposals we should lose the unilateral veto which we had hoped to retain over the proceedings in the Internal Security Council, and the effective decision in that Council would be transferred to the representative of the Federation of Malaya who would enjoy a casting vote. Nevertheless the interests of the Federation were likely to coincide with our own and it was probable that conservative elements would remain in power in Malaya for a considerable time to come. We might therefore be risking relatively little if we accepted the proposals of the Singapore delegation, while if we rejected them we should sacrifice the advantage of a settlement with good will. The Singapore delegation, which included the leader of the People's Action Party, comprised all the elements favourable to us in Singapore who were likely to command a majority there. If we failed to reach agreement with this delegation we should be unable to achieve a satisfactory settlement with the more extreme elements who would replace them.

In discussion the view was expressed that the weakening of our direct authority which was inherent in the counter-proposals of the Singapore delegation carried potentially grave risks, particularly in connection with any Bill affecting the functions of the police. It was a major decision, profoundly affecting the interests of several members of the Commonwealth, to accept an arrangement under which our effective control of our last major base in the Far East would become dependent on the continued existence of a sympathetic Government in Malaya. It could be argued, from this point of view, that we should insist on an unqualified right to reserve legislation for Her Majesty's pleasure as we had done under the constitution of Northern Ireland. On the other hand, we should be retaining in

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Singapore, as we had not in Northern Ireland, the ultimate power to suspend the constitution itself; and, although it would be preferable to exercise that power with the support of the Internal Security Council, our rights of suspension would, juridically, be completely unfettered. Moreover, the proposals of the delegation merely reflected a continuance of the present state of affairs in Singapore. It had not recently been politically feasible for the Governor to contemplate reserving a Bill\* and he had had to rely, in the last resort, on the power to suspend the constitution. In a *bona fide* dispute in the Internal Security Council, on which differing opinions might legitimately be held, we could reasonably count on the support of the Federation representative; while, if the dispute was motivated by political considerations, the situation would, in any event, be one which could be dealt with only by the suspension of the constitution. There was no easy solution to the political problem of maintaining a British base in a remote territory peopled by an alien community, and if there was any prospect of achieving this objective by consent it was in our interest to take advantage of it.

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The Cabinet—

Approved the proposals in C. (57) 78.

*Cabinet Office, S.W.1,*  
*1st April, 1957.*

\* Reserving a Bill for the consideration of the British Government. In other words the Governor of Singapore before independence, as representative of the Queen in the colony, could decide that a Bill passed by the Singapore Legislature would not become law if London had an objection.



***The probable development  
of the Commonwealth  
over the next fifteen years***

June 1956

[...] The present pattern of the Commonwealth  
Commonwealth links

***a. General***

3. A group, of which the United Kingdom is the keystone, and which but for the existence of the United Kingdom would disintegrate regionally, of independent sovereign States with varying constitutional structures, races, religions, historical and economic backgrounds, linked by allegiance to, or the common headship of, the Sovereign; and held together by ties of

- i. Sentiment;
- ii. Tradition;
- iii. Interest.

4. Sentiment is of particular importance in the case of the "old" Commonwealth countries other than South Africa, and of small significance in the case of the "new". Tradition and cultural background are of great importance in all cases. The "new" dominions have been shaped by British political thought. They have inherited, to a greater degree than they realise, British cultural and governmental standards. The significance of the Monarchy is of primary importance principally in Australia, New Zealand, and, to a lesser extent, Canada, where, however, it is material to the politically important French element. But while the Monarchy does not hold so deeply rooted a place in India, Pakistan and Ceylon, it may well be that it can retain a special position in emerging African territories, where there is so strong a tradition of tribal loyalty.

5. Interest, reinforced to some extent by sentiment, is increasingly the decisive link;

***b. Specific links***

6. But in considering the links that hold the Commonwealth together weight must be given also to the facts that:—

- i. in recent years we have actually been drawing closer in understanding with the old Commonwealth countries. It is true that they are becoming stronger and are hence physically better able to pursue their own line

where they wish. But, as they increasingly understand the reality of their independence they have fewer inhibitions in co-operating with us: there is less temptation for them to strike an independent line merely in order to demonstrate their independence. Our physical means of maintaining close consultation with them on all matters have, greatly increased. Consequently they have an increased understanding of our problems, as we have of theirs. We may expect this tendency to increase during the next few years;

ii. the economies of all Commonwealth countries which are members of the Sterling Area are very closely tied up with our economy. They are accustomed to trade with us, as we are with them. That is why it is in their interest that their currencies are tied to sterling and the fact that their currencies are tied to sterling increases the tendency for us to trade with each other. These bonds should continue independently whether some Commonwealth countries (particularly the emergent ones) become Republics or even leave the Commonwealth. These economic bonds with us inevitably affect the policies of the countries concerned, and will tend to keep them in the Commonwealth. [...]

### *The importance of the United Kingdom in the Commonwealth structure*

9. It has to be accepted that the United Kingdom is the keystone of Commonwealth arch. Without it, it is impossible to conceive the Commonwealth holding together for long. Nor it is easy to conceive any other Commonwealth country, however greatly its wealth and population might increase, taking its place even if the Sovereign were to move to it.

10. The United Kingdom:

- i. is the headquarters and normal residence of the Sovereign, who is the sole formal link between the Commonwealth countries;
- ii. is responsible for the Colonial Empire which is world wide and which constitutes a series of links, geographical, military and economic, between the Commonwealth countries. The major units in the Colonial Empire are moving forward to Commonwealth Membership. But the process is very gradual;
- iii. has closer links, political, economic, sentimental, traditional, with each individual Commonwealth country than any of them have with any other Commonwealth (or indeed foreign) country, save perhaps for the U.S.: Canadian relation;

iv. is closely tied in with Europe, the traditional source of world conflict; a bridge between free Europe and the U.S.A.; and a halfway house between the U.S.A. and Soviet Russia.

v. is economically a great world centre of industry, commerce and finance, and the headquarters of the sterling area. Economic self-interest binds the Commonwealth countries and the United Kingdom together;

vi. is still in its own right a very greater power, and incomparably more important internationally than even the most important of the Commonwealth countries.

vii. is a major contributor to Commonwealth defence [...]

Paper from the Commonwealth Relations Office (to the Cabinet)

CO 1032/51, no 112

Source: Goldsworthy D. (Editor) *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957*, Part I, HMSO, 1994, p. 93-95.

## EARLY CONSERVATIVE REACTIONS TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

### **Winston Churchill, Conservative Party Annual Conference, October 1948**

Churchill was Conservative Party leader and leader of the Opposition. Churchill became Prime Minister (again) in 1951.

*The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all that that comprises. Then there is also the English-speaking world, in which we, Canada, and the other British dominions play so important part. And finally there is united Europe. These three majestic circles are coexistent, and if they are linked together, there is no force of combination which could overthrow them or even challenge them. Now, if you think of the three interlinked circles, you will see that we are the only country which has a great part in every one of them. We stand, in fact, at the very point of junction, and here in this island at the centre of the seaways, and perhaps of the airways also, we have the opportunity of joining them all together.*

### **Harold Macmillan, Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, Strasbourg, August 16, 1950 (on the European Coal and Steel Community)**

Macmillan was a prominent Conservative MP. He subsequently was a Cabinet member in the Churchill and Eden governments in the 1950s before becoming Prime Minister in 1957. He led Britain's first application for membership in the EEC.

*One thing is certain, and we may as well face it. Our people are not going to hand to any supranational authority, the right to close down our pits or steelworks. We will allow no supranational authority to put large masses of our people out of work in Durham, in the Midlands, in South Wales, or in Scotland.*

*Fearing the weakness of democracy, men have often sought safety in technocrats. There is nothing new in this. It is as old as Plato. But frankly, the idea is not attractive to the British... We have not overthrown the divine right of kings to fall down before the divine right of experts.*

### **Sir Anthony Eden, Gabriel Silver lecture, Columbia University, January 11, 1952.**

Anthony Eden was Foreign Secretary in the Churchill government of 1951-1955 and de facto Deputy Prime Minister. Eden became Prime Minister in 1955.

*You will realise that I am speaking of the frequent suggestion that the United Kingdom should join a federation on the continent of Europe. This is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do.*

*We know that if we were to attempt it, we should relax the springs of our action in the Western Democratic case and in the Atlantic association which is the expression of that cause. For Britain's story and her interests lie far beyond the continent of Europe. Our thoughts move across the seas to the many communities in which our people play their part, in every corner of the world. These are our family ties. That is our life: without it we should be no more than some millions of people living in an island off the coast of Europe, in which nobody wants to take any particular interest.*

## After The Common Market

The European Economic Community is far too narrow and inward-looking a group for Britain — a world trading nation with vital economic and political links in all continents — to join in its present form. General de Gaulle's decisive veto of Britain's second application to join the EEC, together with growing evidence of widespread opposition in French industry to British membership, have merely reasserted what should have been plain before : that Britain should develop and foster her own much wider influence in the world and not dispute fruitlessly with France the control of this particular corner of one continent.

It has become tediously fashionable in recent years to repeat that post-1945 Britain, having lost her naval, military and industrial pre-eminence of nineteenth-century imperialist days, must therefore seek a new rôle in the world. Of course, it is true that British military and economic power has declined relatively to that of other countries. Population changes in themselves would have done that. But the hasty and misleading conclusion is sometimes drawn from this fact that all the aims and principles of our national policy should also be altered root and branch. Certainly we can no longer dominate other continents by military or economic pressure ; but it does not follow from this that we need, or should, cease to influence them at all. The methods must change ; but many of the objectives — international law and order, a peaceful world, a high standard of living for ourselves and others — need not.

In future Britain will have to pursue these objectives, not by military or economic power, but by trade, by technical and scientific skill, by overseas investment and by the spread of British political, social and cultural ideas. But if we are going to succeed in this, it will be crucial for us to maintain both our economic vitality and our distinctive political independence. This does not mean that we should be slow to join international organizations or to build them up. On the contrary, we should take the lead in constructing and strengthening effective international authorities, because peace and trade are our two greatest interests. But it does mean that we should participate in these as a nation, benefiting by our long tradition of government by consent, of democratically maintained law and order, and our twentieth-century allegiance to social justice and peaceful settlement of international disputes. And since these are not contributions to one continent, colour or type of society alone, we should not allow our outlook, interests or influence to be artificially narrowed into one small part of the globe. Only those who take a very crude view of modern society will suppose that Britain's problem of adjustment to the contemporary world is as simple as crossing one area off a map in favour of another.

In deciding, therefore, what is the wisest solution to the bewildering problem of our relations with Western and Eastern Europe, which has perplexed British Governments ever since 1945, we should be guided first and foremost by the likely effects of any decisions on British strength and British independence. There has been too much obsession in this country recently with "European" needs and too little with British interest. Yet other Governments, in Europe and outside, can be safely relied upon to defend their interests and ignore ours. In addition, while we must certainly learn the lessons of the present, and look mainly to the

future, it is also foolish and fatal to ignore the lessons of the past. Britain has preserved her strength and independence and resisted attack for a thousand years, firstly, by maintaining unity at home while others quarrelled ; secondly, by allying herself in the last resort with those nations who could effectively resist the most powerful potential aggressor ; and thirdly, since the sixteenth century and the development of the new continents, by extending British power and influence, economic and political, widely throughout the world. We should never have survived either the First or the Second World War, if we had not stuck to the proven policy of bringing in the new world to redress the balance of the old. It would be naive and blind to throw away in a few short years of forgetfulness what has taken so long to learn.

Accordingly, when we ask ourselves, as we must at the present time, what our attitude and policy should be towards the European Economic Community, we must do it, not with narrow eyes fixed on Brussels or one corner of Western Europe, but in the far wider context of both time and space within which modern Britain has come into being and must now live. As soon as we do that, the truth emerges that Britain's whole future depends on our preserving and strengthening our world links and our close relations, political and economic, with very many countries in all continents and of various political allegiances, colours and creeds. Neither economically, politically, culturally nor sentimentally are we a merely European power — if indeed "Europe" can be said to exist as anything more than a stretch of land from the Urals to the Atlantic coast. The British public just does not feel itself more closely allied to Poles or Spaniards than to the people of Australia or New Zealand.

Douglas Jay, *After the Common Market*, 1968.

Douglas Jay was President of the Board of Trade from October 1964 till August 1967, and has been Labour M.P. for North Battersea since 1946. Born in 1907, he was educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford, where he gained a first, from 1930 until 1937 he was a fellow of All Souls'. He joined the staff of *The Times* in 1929 and the *Economist* in 1933 ; in 1937 he became city editor of the *Daily Herald*. He was assistant secretary at the Ministry of Supply from 1941 to 1943 and principal secretary at the Board of Trade, 1943-5. For a year he was personal assistant to the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee ; then, from 1947 until 1951, he was successively Economic and Financial Secretary to the Treasury. He has published *The Socialist Case* (1937), *Who is to Pay for the War and the Peace?* (1941), and *Socialism in the New Society* (1962).

## Robin Cook on Europe

### Extracts from a speech by the foreign secretary to the Social Market Foundation in London, Thursday April 19, 2001.

To deny that Britain is European is to deny both our geography and our history. Our culture, our security, and our prosperity, are inseparable from the continent of Europe.

Underlying the anti-European case is the belief that there is an alternative future available to Britain. It used to be argued that the European Union is not Europe and that Britain could exist perfectly comfortably as one of a number of European countries maintaining a loose association with Brussels. But with the majority of non-EU states now clamouring for full membership, the changing geopolitics of Europe have consigned that argument to the past.

Some anti-Europeans now argue that Britain's destiny lies outside Europe, as part of "the English-speaking world" and a member of NAFTA.

Yet Britain trades three times more with the rest of the EU than we do with NAFTA. The reason why over four thousand US companies have located here is because they want to export to Europe. If they only wanted to sell to NAFTA, they would have stayed at home.

Europe is where our domestic quality of life is most directly at stake, whether the issue is environmental standards, the fight against organised crime, policy on asylum or stability on the continent.

But it is not simply a question of economic and political realism that ties Britain to Europe, compelling as those arguments are. Britain is also a European country in the more profound sense of sharing European assumptions about how society should be organised. The last international survey of social attitudes put Britain squarely within the European mainstream on our approach to social justice and public services, such as health.

There are strong ties of kinship between Britain and North America. These are an immense asset to us in the modern world. The US and the UK are each other's closest allies. But our value as an ally to our friends in Washington is in direct proportion to our influence with our partners in Europe.

I do not accept that to acknowledge our European identity diminishes our Britishness. Nor do I accept that membership of the European Union is a threat to our national identity.

None of our European partners, with their own proud national traditions, seem afflicted by this self-doubt and insecurity. The idea that the French, the Germans or the Spanish are attempting to erase their national identities by constructing a "country called Europe" is the mother of all Euromyths. On the contrary, our partners see their membership of a successful European Union as underwriting, not undermining, their assertion of national identity.

[...] Britain has everything to gain from being a leading partner in a strong Europe. All we have to lose is the timidity which prevents us from embracing our European destiny and from recognising that it is a source of confidence in our nation's future.

In the aftermath of Nice, it is clearer than ever that a strong Europe requires strong nations. With the accession of up to twelve new member states, the European Union is set to become even more diverse. In the next Inter-Governmental Conference, the challenge is to find the right balance between European and national decision-making and to enhance the EU's legitimacy by harnessing the democratic traditions of its member states.

This is a debate that Britain can play a pivotal role in shaping. But we can only do so if we reject insular nationalism and the politics of fear by engaging fully and confidently in Europe.

## “We have ceased to be a nation in retreat”

**Margaret Thatcher, speech to a rally of Conservative women, Cheltenham, 3 July 1982**

Today we meet in the aftermath of the Falklands Battle. Our country has won a great victory and we are entitled to be proud. This nation had the resolution to do what it knew had to be done—to do what it knew was right. ...

Now that it is all over, things cannot be the same again for we have learned something about ourselves—a lesson which we desperately needed to learn. When we started out, there were the waverers and the fainthearts. The people who thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself. The people who thought we could no longer do the great things which we once did. Those who believed that our decline was irreversible—that we could never again be what we were. There were those who would not admit it—even perhaps some here today—people who would have strenuously denied the suggestion but—in their heart of hearts—they too had their secret fears that it was true: that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world.

Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history. This generation can match their fathers and grandfathers in ability, in courage, and in resolution. We have not changed. When the demands of war and the dangers to our own people call us to arms—then we British are as we have always been: competent, courageous and resolute. ...

Yet why does it need a war to bring out our qualities and reassert our pride? Why do we have to be invaded before we throw aside our selfish aims and begin to work together as only we can work and achieve as only we can achieve? That, ladies and gentlemen, really is the challenge we as a nation face today. We have to see that the spirit of the South Atlantic—the real spirit of Britain—is kindled not only by war but can now be fired by peace.

We have the first pre-requisite. We know we can do it—we haven't lost the ability. That is the Falklands Factor. We have proved ourselves to ourselves. It is a lesson we must not now forget. Indeed it is a lesson which we must apply to peace just as we have learned it in war. The faltering and the self-doubt has given way to achievement and pride. We have the confidence and we must use it. ...

We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. We have instead a new-found confidence—born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles away. That confidence comes from the re-discovery of ourselves, and grows with the recovery of our self-respect. And so today, we can rejoice at our success in the Falklands and take pride in the achievement of the men and women of our Task Force. But we do so, not as at some last flickering of a flame which must soon be dead. No—we rejoice that Britain has re-kindled that spirit which has fired her for generations past and which today has begun to burn as brightly as before.

Britain found herself again in the South Atlantic and will not look back from the victory she has won.

**Margaret Thatcher, The Bruges Speech, 1988**

My first guiding principle is this: willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community. To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France 5 as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.

Some of the founding fathers of the Community thought that the United States of America might be its model. But the whole history of America is quite different from Europe. People went there to get away from the intolerance and constraints of life in Europe. They sought liberty and opportunity; 10 and their strong sense of purpose has, over two centuries, helped to create a new unity and pride in being American, just as our pride lies in being British or Belgian or Dutch or German.

I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to speak with a single voice. I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone. 15 Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defence or in our relations with the rest of the world.

But working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy. Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet Union, which have tried to run everything from the centre, are learning that success depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, there are some in the Community 20 who seem to want to move in the opposite direction. We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.

Certainly we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose. But it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national 25 pride in one's own country; for these have been the source of Europe's vitality through the centuries.

## Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson's Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, October 2016

[We] must be humble and realistic enough to accept that in many eyes the notion that we could endlessly expand the realm of liberal democracy was badly damaged, alas, by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and symmetrically our model of free-market anglo-saxon capitalism as practised in London and New York was seriously discredited by the Crash of 2008, and the

5 global suspicion of bankers. And we have taken those twin blows like punches to the midriff; and we have been winded and sometimes lacking in confidence in these ideals; and if you look at the course of events in the last ten years, I am afraid you can make the case that it is partly as a result of that lack of western self-confidence – political, military, economic – that in some material ways the world has got less safe, more dangerous, more worrying.

10 After a long post-war period in which the world was broadly getting more peaceful the number of deaths in conflict has risen from 49,000 in 2010 to 167,000 last year. ... and then there is perhaps an even more pernicious phenomenon – stemming, however unfairly, from the disastrous events in Iraq, which is the temptation of more and more governments to take this instability and insecurity as an excuse to move away from democracy.

15 ...  
And so if I have one message for you this afternoon, my friends, it is that this illiberal analysis is deeply and dangerously wrong and that these social and political freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to practice whatever religion you want and to live your life as you please –, these freedoms are not inimical to prosperity – they are  
20 in fact essential to sustained growth. This is not the moment to cast aspersions on any other country where lack of freedom is hindering economic growth. I can prove my point simply by asking you to look at the society we live in, a 21st century Britain that incarnates that symmetry. Why have we got more tech wizards in London than any other city in Europe ? Is it because the politicians decided to embark on a soviet style programme of training people to  
25 do tech? On the contrary, I had no idea what tech was – though later claimed credit for it. It was because London acquired a deserved reputation as the greatest city on earth, a great jiving funkapolitan melting-pot where provided you did nothing to damage the interests of others and provided you obeyed the law, you could make of your life pretty much what you wanted. And that's why we lead in all those creative and cultural sectors. And that's why we  
30 have the best universities because the best minds from across the world are meeting in some of the best pubs and bars and nightclubs like subatomic particles colliding in a cyclotron, and they are producing those flashes of innovation that are essential for long term economic success. And it will not surprise you to know that Britain is ranked among the top three most innovative societies on earth. America is 4th and China is 25th and indeed the entire top ten  
35 innovative societies are free market liberal democracies. And that is why we are still the fastest growing European economy, according to the OECD. And this new and dynamic government led by Theresa May is working not just to ensure that this success is felt by everyone in a country that works for everyone, but I also believe we should have absolutely no shame or embarrassment in championing our ideals around the world. And in this era of dithering and  
40 dubitation this should be the message of global Britain to the world: that we stick up for free markets as vigorously as we stick up for democracy and human rights and when all is said and done, my friends – and I know that not everyone will agree with this, but what the hell – I believe that vote on June 23 was for economic freedom and political freedom as well.

Over the last couple of months I have sat in all kinds of EU meetings vast and ruminative  
45 feasts of lunch or dinner in the castles of Mitteleuropa washed down with the finest wines  
known to man and on one occasion a splendid breakfast that seemed to stretch, for course  
after course, from 8 am to 11, and I have enjoyed them all. I have made friends, alliances  
50 and had wonderful conversations in my various euro-creoles, but I have to tell any lingering  
gloomadon-poppers that never once have I felt that this country would be in any way  
disadvantaged by extricating ourselves from the EU treaties. And indeed there are some ways  
in which we will be liberated to be more active on the world stage than ever before,  
because we are not leaving Europe.

We will remain committed to all kinds of European cooperation – at an intergovernmental  
level whether it is maintaining sanctions against Russia for what is happening in Ukraine or  
55 sending our navy to help the Italians stem the migrant flow through the central  
Mediterranean. But we will also be able to speak up more powerfully with our own distinctive  
voice leading the world as we now are, in imposing a ban on ivory, helping to save the elephant  
60 in a way that the disunited EU is unable to do (in fact we have an absurd situation in which  
the EU is actually trying to veto the ivory ban in spite of having a president called Donald Tusk)  
65 or relaunching the cause of global free trade that has been stalled since the failure of the Doha  
round. And I can think of few more positive forces in the global economy than the world's fifth  
richest economy taking back control, not just of our democracy and our borders and our cash  
but taking back control of our tariff schedules in Geneva, so that we can galvanise free trade,  
break the log jam. And as our new PM has rightly said, we can now become the global  
champions and agitators for this phenomenon doing free trade deals with countries around  
65 the world — as Liam will do deals that will continue the process of lifting billions out of  
poverty. And that is why the world needs Global Britain more than ever as a campaigner for  
the values we believe in, a catalyst for change and reform and economic and political freedom  
70 in a world that has lost confidence in those values. And of course there are those who say that  
we can't do it – that we are too small, too feeble, too geopolitically reduced to have that kind  
of influence. I think of the pogonologically challenged Labour party, where they literally want  
75 to abolish the armed services and to keep our new nuclear submarines as a demented job  
creation programme – sending them to sea without any nukes aboard so that the whole nation  
is turned into a kind of glorified military capon firing blanks.

I am not going to pretend that this country is something we are not. Every day I go into an  
office so vast that you could comfortably fit two squash courts and so dripping with gilt bling  
that it looks like something from the Kardashians. And as I sit at the desk of George Nathaniel  
Curzon, I sometimes reflect that this was once the nerve centre of an empire that was 7 times  
80 the size of the Roman empire at its greatest extent under Trajan. And when I go into the Map  
Room of Palmerston, I cannot help remembering that this country over the last two hundred  
years has directed the invasion or conquest of 178 countries – that is most of the members of  
the UN – not a point I majored on in New York at the United Nations General Assembly and  
that is because those days are gone forever and that is a profoundly good thing.

It is good for Britain and good for the world that in the last 60 years – in living memory –  
85 those responsibilities have been taken away. And yet, it would be a fatal mistake now to  
underestimate what this country is doing or what it can do because in spite of Iraq, it is simply  
not the case that every military intervention has been a disaster. Far from it...

Look at the achievement in Sierra Leone, where we were instrumental not just in ending  
90 the civil war, but in wiping out Ebola. Look at Somalia, where my predecessor William Hague  
helped initiate a bold programme to tackle the pirates that plagued the coast of that country,

together with a coalition of other European countries. British ships took them on, with all the courage and decisiveness of our 19th century forebears. And the result? Before the anti-pirate campaign, their depredations had cost the world economy about \$7bn a year. When Britain stepped in, the attacks stopped altogether – and it is a happy fact that since 2012 there have 95 been more Hollywood films about Somali pirates starring Tom Hanks than there have been pirate attacks.

Of course we don't want to wield our hard power; we think an age before we do so. But when we give our armed services clear and achievable missions we can still be remarkably effective and with 2 per cent of our GDP spent on defence we will be the leading military 100 player in western Europe for the foreseeable future and our hard power, Conference, is dwarfed by a phenomenon that the pessimists never predicted when we unbundled the British empire and that is soft power – the vast and subtle and pervasive extension of British influence around the world that goes with having the language that was invented and perfected in this country and now has more speakers than any other language on earth. And 105 up the creeks and inlets of every continent on earth there go the gentle kindly gunboats of British soft power captained by Jeremy Clarkson – a prophet more honoured abroad, alas, than in his own country — or JK Rowling who is worshipped by young people in some Asian countries as a kind of divinity, or just the BBC – and no matter how infuriating and shamelessly 110 anti-Brexit they can sometimes be, I think the Beeb is the single greatest and most effective ambassador for our culture and our values, and it was Sergei Lavrov himself who told me that he had not only watched our version of war and peace, but thought it was “very well done” and that, from the Kremlin, was praise. And if you want final proof of our irresistible soft power I remind you as I always do that this country not only invented or codified just about every 115 sport or game known to humanity but this year it was our athletes – from a country that can boast only 1 per cent of the world’s population – that came second in the Olympic and paralympic games and I hope my friends in Beijing will not mind if I point out that their teams had 1.4bn people to draw on.

## Brexit, Empire, and Decolonization

Much of the debate around the referendum on continuing membership of the European Union was about ‘reclaiming our national sovereignty’. However, Britain has always been an *imperial* state, not a national one. When Britain was formed through the Act of Union in 1707, the Kingdoms of England and Scotland

5 already had established colonies, including that of Ireland in the case of England and other territories in the so-called New World. After Union, they went on to establish an empire that, at its height, covered one quarter of the earth and governed over one fifth of its population – including by the 1920s, over one half of the world’s Muslims. This British state was an imperial state and, as such, necessarily multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural from the outset.

10 The Leave victory has been seen as an expression of frustration by those who believed themselves to have been betrayed by a metropolitan elite. The problem was that ‘newcomers’ had been given equal status as citizens and this had undermined the conditions of those presented as ‘insiders’. Belonging to the history of the nation was presented as necessary to be a legitimate agent within politics and a legitimate object of policy initiatives in the present. This failure to recognise Britain’s imperial past limits the population that gets to be considered as ‘inside’ the polity historically and thus to have legitimate claims to determine it in the present.

15 The standard view of the British state is expressed by Garry Runciman: that the institutional modes of production, coercion and persuasion, deemed to be characteristic of British society, were all fully formed by the First World War and have remained relatively stable since then. Empire forms no part of his account of those modes and the decline of empire similarly has little import in terms of understanding Britain subsequently.

20 However, the British state and its institutions developed in the context of imperial expansion and through the appropriation of the material resources of empire. In the broadest terms, colonialism is about appropriation, settlement, and possession. It is about the establishment of political authority over populations to which there was no legitimate claim. Dispossession, enslavement and other forms of 25 forced labour were employed to the profit of those who established their private property in empire and wealth was also extracted through coercive forms of taxation. As Utsa Patnaik (2017) has argued, the drain from the colonies was immeasurable in terms of financing the imperial state.

25 Indeed, in his 1884 address on ‘The General Statistics of the British Empire’, Sir Richard Temple set out that over half of the annual revenue of the British national government came from taxing the labour and resources of those within empire, beyond the national state. That is, *over half of the income at the disposal of the government in Westminster came from the land, labour, and resources of those who, today, are deemed to have no historically based claims here.*

30 These colonial relations, established on racialised hierarchies, were imported back into the imperial metropole and translated into second class citizenship for darker British citizens – something that we are seeing playing out today with the Windrush scandal which, incidentally, does not only affect 35 populations from the Caribbean, but from across

40 what was the British Commonwealth. The colonial imaginary of the British state turned darker citizens into migrants while allowing white migrants – or at least their children – to become citizens. Where once racialised hierarchy described unequal membership in the imperial polity, it now functioned as the basis of discrimination and domination within the national polity.

45 Until the 1967 and 1969 Race Relations Acts were passed, it was legal to discriminate on the basis of race in housing, employment, education, and access to public services. Access to good working-class jobs was often mediated by trade unions, however, many unions operated an informal colour bar and refused to allow the employment of darker citizens. This only began to change once the Race Relations Acts had been passed and were used for legal redress. The outlawing of racial discrimination can be

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seen as one step in the process of remaking the polity on the basis of understandings of equality. However, the political moves, half a decade later, of Britain entering the European Economic Community suppressed the political framing of this as part of the process of what it would mean for Britain to decolonise. As such, it never had to reckon with what it meant to go from being a global empire to being a small state.

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While the predominantly white population of the imperial metropole may never have been asked if they wished the country to become multicultural, this is not a postwar process, but arose out of **empire building**. There was no complaint about the multicultural polity when those others were being exploited for the benefit of the metropole. Rather, objections were only raised when, making return journeys back to the metropole, racialised others sought to participate in it as equals. To situate the arrival and presence of these people as illegitimate in order ‘to take back control’ is more than disingenuous. It trades upon racism while simultaneously eliding it. This is how commentators have recently been able to argue ‘white self-interest’ is legitimate and not to be understood as problematic. There is no legitimacy to a framing of history that rests on underpinning assumptions of white supremacy and the domination of others.

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What we are currently witnessing with Brexit is what the end of empire looks like. When the history of empire is elided and repressed – instead of being reckoned with – there is no real way forward. If we are to have a future as a liberal democratic state it has to involve addressing the past injustices which continue to disfigure our contemporary social and political landscapes.

65

By Gurminder K. Bhambra (Professor of Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies in the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex) • December 19, 2018 • in Histories of the Present. <http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/brexit-empire-and-decolonization/>

## Winston Churchill's Election Address at Usher Hall, Edinburgh, 14<sup>th</sup> February 1950

The prime minister, Mr. Attlee, has made it clear that his intention is to establish a Socialist State in this island at the earliest moment. He intends to create a society in which the state will control and own all the means of production, distribution and exchange. We have had one instalment of this during the last four and a half years, and now we are asked to vote whether we want to take a second plunge into

5 this immense social and economic revolution. . . .

This attempt to establish a Socialist State in Great Britain affects the relations of England and Scotland in a direct and serious manner. The principle of centralisation of government in Whitehall and Westminster is emphasised in a manner not hitherto experienced or contemplated in the Act of Union. The supervision, interference and control in the ordinary details of Scottish life and business by the

10 Parliament at Westminster has not hitherto been foreseen, and I frankly admit that it raises new issues between our two nations.

If England became an absolute Socialist State, owning all the means of production, distribution and exchange, ruled only by politicians and their officials in the London offices, I personally cannot feel that Scotland would be bound to accept such a dispensation. I do not therefore wonder that the question 15 of Scottish home rule, and all this movement of Scottish nationalism has gained in strength with the growth of Socialist authority and ambitions in England. I would never adopt the view that Scotland should be forced into the serfdom of socialism as a result of a vote in the House of Commons. It is an alteration so fundamental in our way of life that it would require a searching review of our historical relations.

20 But here I speak to the Scottish Nationalists in words, as diplomatic language puts it, of great truth and respect, and I say this position has not yet been reached. If we act together with our united strength it may never arise. I do not believe that the British nation or the English people will accept the Socialist State. There is a deep fund of common sense in the English race and they have all sorts of ways, as has been shown in the past, of resisting and limiting the imposition of state autocracy. It would be a great 25 mistake for Scotsmen to suppose that Mr Attlee's policy can effectively be imposed upon us at the present time. And here in this election, so momentous in its character and consequences, we all have the opportunity of inflicting a shattering defeat upon this menace to our individual liberties, and to the well understood, and hitherto widely-admired British way of life. I most strongly urge all Scotsmen to fight one battle at a time. We have every hope that the socialist schemes for netting us up and tying us 30 down will be torn in pieces by the votes of the British people. We shall know more about it after February 23. It may indeed be a turning point in our island story. Scotsmen would make the wrong decision if they tried to separate their fortunes from ours at a moment when together we may lift them all to a higher plane of freedom and security.

35 It would indeed be foolish to cast splitting votes or support splitting candidates, the result of which might be to bring about that evil Whitehall tyranny and centralization, when by one broad heave of the British national shoulders, the whole gimcrack structure of Socialist jargon and malice may be cast in splinters to the ground.

...

40 The Socialist centralization menace has however advanced so far as to entitle Scotland to further guarantees of national security and internal independence. These can be provided effectively by new additional representation at the centre and at the summit, which, if the Conservatives and Unionists are returned to power, will be accorded to Scotland, by a Unionist Cabinet. Besides strengthening the establishment of Under-Secretaries of State, we shall advise the creation of a new office of Minister of State for Scotland. He would be a minister of Cabinet rank and will be deputy to the Secretary of State. 45 Such an appointment would enable a senior member of the Cabinet to be constantly in Scotland. Because of the large changes in economic and financial affairs which have come about in recent years, we shall appoint a Royal Commission to review the whole situation between Scotland and England, and we shall take good care that this does not become an instrument of delay upon practical action.

■ 5. The 1979 Referendum: NO

■ 6. The 1979 Referendum: YES

# THE REFERENDUM

## Think it Out for yourself

THINK of the cost of the Assembly.  
THINK of the extra burden on your rates.  
THINK of another layer of government.  
THINK of a thousand more civil servants in Scotland.  
THINK of more controls, laws, regulations and directives.  
THINK of how the parliamentary power of Scotland's MPs would shrank.  
THINK of the bickering and quarrels between Edinburgh and London.  
THINK of the slide to separation.  
THINK of the break-up of Britain.

**AND WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?**


of a single certain way in which the Assembly would bring the  
smallest real benefit either to  
the United Kingdom  
or to Scotland  
or to your region  
or to your district  
or to your friends  
or to your family  
or to yourself

**AND WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?**

WHO are pressing hardest for the Assembly.  
WHY they want it, and  
WHAT it would do for them

**AND WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?**

WHEN THE REFERENDUM COMES  
ON MARCH 1<sup>ST</sup> MAKE SURE THAT  
**SCOTLAND SAYS NO**



# Referendum 1<sup>st</sup> March

## Vote positively

# YES

YES

YES

FOR THE POLL, CALL 556 2655

Now or never. That stark choice faces every Scot. On March 1<sup>st</sup> we decide for all time whether we have a Scottish Assembly.

All time? That's it. Scotland for over a century has sought some measure of home rule. Now Westminster has ordered a referendum to prove we really want the Assembly.

The vote is unique. If Scotland says "NO" after years spent demanding devolution, we will never be taken seriously again. Scotland will be universally ridiculed. A laughing stock. All bark, no bite.

Our self respect demands that Scotland resumes responsibility for key areas of domestic policy. The Assembly helps us work out our own solutions to make Scotland flourish.

Referendum Day is different. Each of us holds the future of Scotland in our hands. We can make or break — send Scotland surging forward or settle forever for the second rate.

Vote positively. "YES" — it is truly now or never!

Published by 'Yes for Scotland' Campaign

## Dual Identities, 1982

The striking feature of the table below is that they who are foremost in claiming their Britishness are those whose link to Britain is the most fragile – and the least accepted by the rest of the kingdom.

National identity in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Think of self as	England	Scotland	Wales	Northern Ireland	
				Protestant	R. Catholic
	%	%	%	%	%
British	38	35	33	67	15
Scottish	2	52	–	–	–
Welsh	1	–	57	–	–
English	57	2	8	–	–
Ulster	n.a.	–	–	20	6
Irish	1	1	–	8	69
Other, mixed, don't know	1	10	2	5	10
	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: For Scotland and Wales, data supplied by survey directors from their respective machine readable files: J.A. Brand and W.I. Miller, *Scottish Election Survey 1979* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde); and Denis Balsom and P.J. Madgwick, *Welsh Election Survey 1979* (Aberystwyth: University of Wales). For Northern Ireland, see E. Moxon-Browne, "Northern Ireland Attitude Survey: an Initial Report" (Belfast: Queen's University, duplicated, 1979), p. 9. For England, data supplied by the Gallup Poll, London.

# National identity

The 2011 census asked people what country or countries they felt an affiliation to.

National identity is not tied to [ethnicity](#) or [country of birth](#). A foreign citizen living in Scotland is free to choose 'Scottish' as their national identity.

## Scottish identity

**82.7% of people said they had some Scottish national identity.**

That's 4.4 million people.

Scottish national identity was most common in:

- North Lanarkshire
- Inverclyde
- East Ayrshire
- West Dunbartonshire

Around 90% of people in each of these areas said they had some Scottish national identity.

70.5% of City of Edinburgh residents claimed some Scottish national identity. This was the lowest in Scotland.

## Scottish identity only

**62.4% of Scotland's population said they were 'Scottish only'.**

3.3 million people had Scottish identity only. This was most common in 10 to 14 year olds, at 71.5%.

It was least common among 30 to 34 year olds, at 56.7%.

18.3% of the population said their national identity was 'Scottish and British identities only'.

## Ethnic groups

**28.2% of people in minority ethnic groups said they had some Scottish identity.**

This could be either Scottish only, or in combination with another identity.

59.9% of people from a mixed ethnic background had some Scottish identity, along with 50.0% of people from the Pakistani ethnic group.

Scottish identity was least common in African ethnic groups, at 21.2%.

## British identities

**8.4% of the population said they had 'British identity only'.**

443,000 people said they were British only. This was most common in the 50 to 54 age group, at 9.7%.

2.3% of the population had 'English identity only'.

## No UK identity

**4.4% of people said they had no UK identity.**

234,000 people said they had 'other identity only'. This was most common among young adults aged 20 to 34.

John Curtice, 'How Firm are the Foundations? Public Attitudes to the Union in 2007', T.M. Devine, *Scotland and the Union 1707-2007* (Edinburgh University Press, 2008, 214 & 216).

Table 13.1 Trends in forced choice national identity

	1974 (%)	1979 (%)	1992 (%)	1997 (%)	1999 (%)	2000 (%)	2001 (%)	2002 (%)	2003 (%)	2004 (%)	2005 (%)	2006 (%)	2007 (%)
Scottish	65	56	72	72	77	80	77	75	72	75	79	78	71
British	31	38	25	20	17	13	16	18	20	19	14	14	20

Source: Scottish Election Studies 1974-97; Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 1999-2007. Data for 2007 are provisional.

Table 13.2 Trends in Moreno national identity

	1992 (%)	1997 (%)	1999 (%)	2000 (%)	2001 (%)	2003 (%)	2005 (%)	2006 (%)	2007 (%)
Scottish not British	19	23	32	37	36	31	32	33	26
More Scottish than British	40	38	35	31	30	34	32	32	30
Equally Scottish and British	33	27	22	21	24	22	22	21	28
More British than Scottish	3	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	5
British not Scottish	3	4	4	4	3	4	5	5	6

Source: Scottish Election Studies, 1992, 1997; Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 1999-2007. Data for 2007 are provisional.

# Devolution: A beginner's guide

**Since 1999, the way the United Kingdom is run has been transformed by devolution - a process designed to decentralise government and give more powers to the three nations which, together with England, make up the UK.**

The United Kingdom is made up of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Devolution essentially means the transfer of powers from the UK parliament in London to assemblies in Cardiff and Belfast, and the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh.

## **When did it begin?**

Public votes were held in 1997 in Scotland and Wales, and a year later in both parts of Ireland.

This resulted in the creation of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Devolution applied in different ways in each nation due to historical and administrative differences.

## **What powers are devolved?**

The table below gives an overview of the main powers given to the Northern Irish and Welsh assemblies, and the Scottish Parliament.

### **MAJOR DEVOLVED POWERS**

<b>SCOTLAND</b>	<b>WALES</b>	<b>N. IRELAND</b>
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	Agriculture, forestry & fishing	Agriculture
Education	Education	Education
Environment	Environment	Environment
Health	Health & social welfare	Health
Housing	Housing	Enterprise, trade & investment
Justice, policing & courts*	Local government	Social services
Local government	Fire & rescue services	Justice & policing
Fire service	Highways & transport	
Economic development	Economic development	
Some transport		

\*Scotland has always had its own legal system

## **What powers are not devolved?**

The UK government is responsible for national policy on all powers which have not been devolved.

These are known usually as "reserved powers" and include foreign affairs, defence, international relations and economic policy.

This table gives an overview of the main non-devolved powers.

### **MAJOR NON-DEVOLVED POWERS**

<b>SCOTLAND</b>	<b>WALES</b>	<b>N. IRELAND</b>
Constitution	Defence & national security	Defence & national security
Defence & national security	Economic policy	Foreign policy
Foreign policy	Foreign policy	Nationality
Energy	Energy	Energy**
Immigration & nationality	Immigration & nationality	
Trade & industry	[see footnote +]	
Some transport		
Social security		

\*\* - specified as "nuclear energy & installations"

+ - Non-devolved powers in Wales are by implication all those not set out in the 2006 Government of Wales Act

The Westminster Parliament is technically still able to pass laws for any part of the UK, but in practice only deals with devolved matters with the agreement of the devolved governments.

BBC News Website, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/election\\_2010/first\\_time\\_voter/8589835.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/first_time_voter/8589835.stm)



# New dawn is just the beginning

IAN BELL



**The achievement of a dream is only the start. Scotland is setting out on a journey that has never been travelled before**

OUT of the darkness, as James Connolly said of another, less civilised, insurrection, and into the dawn, we begin anew.

But daybreak is often a misty time: the shape of things is not always clear. The truth is that no-one yet knows what the future holds for Edinburgh's parliament.

How will Scotland's four-party politics operate in a parliamentary setting under a proportional system with fixed terms? This has never been attempted before. Labour has never had to deal with a Nationalist opposition and the Nationalists have never had to conduct themselves as a potential party of government.

Equally, we yet to get to a parliament with a civilised number of women. We have yet to see how relations with Westminster will be handled. We do not yet know if London will leave the established funding formula intact. The possibilities are all but endless.

Besides, there will be scope for previously undreamed of alliances within the new parliament. Labour promises to abate increases in taxation; the SNP and the Liberal Democrats show no such resolve. The SNP's leader of a Blair government, the presumption of Labour dominance could begin to look questionable. What parties create the sort of alliances which turned the Yes campaign to a landslide victory? Besides, and most important of all - yesterday was not the end of the constitutional story.

The choice between devolution and the status quo has been made finally, but at no time was the multi-option referendum demanded by the Nationalists even in the offing.

Yesterday was probably just as well. The chances are that the Scottish party would have split three ways and Think Twice would have won by default. Nevertheless, the SNP's referendum, as yet to be tested. Paradoxically, Alex Salmond has done his party good by bailing out a campaign he does not, in principle, favour.

By common consent Alex

Salmond scarcely put a foot wrong during the referendum campaign. In the early stages, indeed, he placed Labour in his debt when the smoke from Paisley threatened to become a brush fire running out of control. He is, perhaps, the most skilled politician in Scotland, the ball in his parliament, he will run with it in Edinburgh, for him, will be the central project, not a distraction from Westminster.

Labour has thus far been most successful in its bid for the grabby sweepings of local government in the west of Scotland do not become the public face of home rule. It will need to do much more. At every turn, and for obvious reasons, it will be the SNP who are the ones competing to define Chancellor Brown's singleness, the one struggling to conceal constitutional anomalies, the one that has to explain why Edinburgh's front-line troops in the defence of the Union.

raise a fraction of its revenues.

Besides, if the referendum campaign has enhanced Scotland's sense of nationhood, what might the parliament do? What will those Labour voters who say they are patriotic to independence conclude when they realise that home rule has not made the sky fall in.

The first step is the hardest when the road ahead is hard to see. The second step will be easier to take.

None of this will happen overnight. Several years will pass before the parliament proves its worth or is discredited. Some Nationalists fear, indeed, that an efficient parliament will go a long way towards destroying the SNP. Perhaps it will.

But unless and until Tony Blair summons up the courage to turn Britain into a properly federal state, Edinburgh will be caught in a mesh of contradictions. The SNP will exploit

each and every one. The ramshackle nature of the British constitution is its best, least secret weapon. Devolution is a hybrid scheme, a compromise that will only work if most people, English and Scottish, in every part, want it to work. The Nationalists will not be wreckers, as is so often alleged, but they cannot be expected to be mute if the parliament runs into difficulties.

What is the SNP answer, for example, to the situation in which Labour's majority depends on its Scottish MP and the Tories raise the West Lothian question? Perhaps a rapprochement between England and Scotland and a constitutional crisis.

What might the Nationalists say? Doubtless the SNP's success has indeed created a palpable unfairness for which there is no real solution - short of independence, amicably agreed, for Scotland. English voters might just be inclined to agree.

The SNP will exploit

nationalism other than a nationalist (with a small "n") affair. Scotland's rights, these are possible to believe that such self-awareness will cease when the new parliament opens its doors and when Nationalists press for independence. Westminster's friends? Hardly. Alex Salmond's party will settle for incremental progress, as always. For the SNP, one side in the argument has been destroyed, one yet remains. Nationalism presses on regardless.

## Let's smash mould of petty party bickering

ALAN COCHRANE



**Scots have the chance to make a parliament that is as distinctive as they are by demanding the highest standards of politicians**

We've done it. Now what? We have voted ourselves a parliament, but does anyone have any idea what kind of parliament? Who will tell us how to do it?

The answer is simple: none. There is nobody but ourselves who should run our own domestic affairs, no model we should slavishly copy; no institution we require to ape.

It is all up to us now. In the bowls of the Scottish Convention by the time we will have voted that now? There are detailed plans laid. Civil servants always have contingencies for everything.

If this is our parliament and we must see what they intend our legislature to be like and until we have approved them, then let us as far as we can keep them on the drawing board. This is in our first parliament in 300 years, we must take a collective pride in it. We must make it distinctive and we must ensure that it remains ours - and not the politicians' or the public service's. We must not be afraid to call it the people's parliament. Tony Blair has pre-fixed so many aspects of life in this country with the word people's that he has all but devoured the word.

However, that should be the essence of what we are about.

Scotland's parliament must be a unique thing. We are a distinctive people and we have thought so long and hard about all this that we must make sure that we create something unique and truly distinctive. We have contributed so much to the legislatures of the rest of the world. Westminster most especially, that when it comes to our own we must take particular care.

This parliament has come

about hesitantly, slowly and, in this moment of final decision, for many people extremely reluctantly. But it has happened and, like it or not, we cannot put the genie back in the bottle. We cannot mess with the genie and then expect to be taken back under Westminster's wing in a few years' time. We have made our bed and must lie in it.

So, what will it look like? I want a parliament which is genuinely a devolved political institution. I want a parliament where party politics is not the be all and end all of public life; where the iron hand of the whips' office does not hold sway; where the black book traditionally kept by the whips of all the major parties is not even kept any more.

It often sounds a hopelessly idealistic thing to say, but party politics, as exhibited in the British parliament, has often been one of the greatest hindrances to the progress of the people. I want a parliament where party politics is not the be all and end all of public life; where the iron hand of the whips' office does not hold sway; where the black book traditionally kept by the whips of all the major parties is not even kept any more.

We are right to be suspicious about the motives ... but the dynamics of consensus and co-operation is sound. What price in Scotland picking up that ball and running with it?

Is there no chance of our politicians taking decisions which affect us all the time, not just the greater good, rather than what is most advantageous for their party?

Those who would call me naive to their country a disservice. This parliament must work. It cannot be allowed to founder and become a wretched oaf of a party.

The whole basis of British politics has been run that way, except in time of war, for 150 years.

Can we not at least try to break that mould? David Owen tried it and founded the rock of transparency party in the 1980s. Tony Blair is trying to build the Liberals their first taste of power and influence since the war by allowing them to take a small part in his decision-making process.

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# DEVOLUTION IN SCOTLAND: THE 1997 REFERENDUM

## A victory for all of us

**R**ARELY can a nation's will have been more settled. With two thumping majorities, which surpassed the hopes of even the most optimistic campaigners, the Scots showed they are the people who like to say yes. They wanted a parliament, they wanted it to pay its way, and now they have granted their own wish. A sense of pride has been stirred, captured by the *Scotsman* newspaper's triumphant headline: "A nation again." But there is much to celebrate across the union — not all of it obvious.


For one thing, a political truism has been broken. The 63.5 per cent of Scots who voted for their new parliament to have tax-varying powers defied the rule which states no electorate will ever freely choose to shell out more of its hard-won earnings to the public coffers. Their decision suggests that when voters can picture their money being spent closer to home, by people they choose, they can think the unthinkable — even voting for what might be higher taxes.

The more direct consequence of the double Yes vote is a surge in momentum for the Government's most radical idea: the spreading out of power. As Tony Blair said on his victory tour last week, "the era of big centralised government" is over. The torch now passes to Wales, which this week will have the chance to get a more democratic grip on the way it is governed. The Yes campaign there has argued that Wales must not get left behind, becoming the only part of the UK still ruled by London diktat. After the Scottish result, that argument has even greater force.

Still, there is cause for caution. The sheer scale of the Yes majorities — with 80 per cent in some districts — has led to quiet fears that a tide of nationalistic feeling has been unleashed that mere devolution alone cannot satisfy. This leaves Labour with a challenge. They have to prove that their campaign rhetoric about strengthening the union was sincere. In short, they must make devolution work. Otherwise Scottish Nationalist Party — and Conservative — warnings of "instability," with endless London-Edinburgh rows about budgets and jurisdiction, will be vindicated and the demand for full-blown separation enhanced.

Labour has to be mindful, too, of the sensitivities of English public opinion. A Scottish parliament will clear the air for touchy questions that were buried during the decades of central control. Many English voters will raise not just the West Lothian question — why should Scots have a say over us when we cannot have a say over them — but also prickly matters of subsidies and hand-outs. Whatever the real numbers, plenty of English men and women imagine they pay Scotland's bills. They will be less willing to do that now. That might translate into a demand for more decentralisation in England: perhaps regional assemblies or an English parliament. But it could also inflame a more brutal English nationalism.

The *Guardian* Weekly 2/3/97



## VOTE OF DESTINY

Scots have given voice to their hearts

Scotland has spoken. Westminster must respond. There could be no clearer mandate: a general election that swept Conservatives from every seat in the country, followed by a referendum that allowed Scots to vote on each aspect of devolution. The nation wants its own parliament, with the power to change taxes. There is no question now of an assembly or a "tartan tax" being imposed on the people of Scotland.

This was a decision that came as much from the heart as the head. Although the White Paper was widely distributed before the poll, most voters had made up their minds long ago. They were not waiting to be swayed by the minutiae of the First Minister's powers or the merits of the electoral system to be used.

The mood was more visceral than that. This was a moment of truth, people felt, a chance to demonstrate Scotland's confidence as a nation — a moment to be seized, for the offer might never be made again. Many were impatient even at the notion of a referendum; they thought that they had made their views known already, on May 1. But, for such a momentous constitutional change, it was right for them to address the specific questions. The referendum, conceived as a defensive measure by the Labour Party in opposition, will now become a necessary cement in the building of a new settlement.

The "yes, yes" campaign had many of the brightest tunes and most of the best musicians. The alliance of Labour, Scottish Nationalists and Liberal Democrats represented the vast majority of political views north of the border and, save for the odd maverick, all its MPs. They could talk of giving Scotland a voice, of renewing faith and trust in the people, of revitalising democracy, of dates with destiny. They


needed merely to mention "poll tax" or "Margaret Thatcher" to win support. They could co-opt *Braveheart* and Sean Connery to their cause. And they could point out that no other country with its own legal system lacks the power to make its own laws.

On tax-varying powers, the arguments were less high-flown, though just as important. "No representation without taxation" became the line: the parliament would be a "Mickey Mouse" assembly, a "talking shop" if it lacked the most important power of all. Its impotence would lead it to blame Westminster at every opportunity, fuelling resentment and giving succour to nationalists. If Scotland wanted to put into practice its more collectivist views, it had to be able to offer its voters the chance to pay more tax for better public services.

The real surprise was the lacklustre nature of the "Think Twice" campaign, which tried to persuade people to vote "no" to both questions. It was almost wholly negative in tone, concocting nightmare visions of the Union breaking up and industry fleeing to England. No positive arguments were made for the status quo, nor was any alternative form of governance offered that might be an improvement on Labour's version. And those who argued most fervently and persuasively against devolution before the election — such as Michael Forsyth and Malcolm Rifkind — were nowhere to be seen.

In the past few months, Scots have been offered two readings of their future: one optimistic, the other pessimistic. They chose to run with the former, and only events will prove them right or wrong. But for now, it is time for Westminster to enact Scotland's "settled will" in a fashion that makes those potential nightmares least likely to be translated into reality.

# THE STATE OF SCOTLAND



## A nation once again?

EDINBURGH

**The elections to the new Scottish Parliament on May 6th are the culmination of a quiet revolution**

**A**SK people in Edinburgh where the Royal Museum is, and you are liable to get puzzled looks. To get directions to what the banners outside the building say is the Royal Museum, it is better to ask for the National Museum of Scotland—because that is what it really is, and is how most Edinburgh citizens think of it.

For Edinburgh is a capital city, with national galleries of art, the headquarters of big banks and the Scottish legal system, a shiny new financial district, and a main street—Princes Street—providing a balcony view across a green valley park to a venerable castle. All in all, this is a city which stands comparison with most other European capitals. And it is soon to be adorned by a new and powerful symbol of nationhood—a Scottish Parliament.

It is not just the Parliament's law-making and tax-raising powers which suggest that it represents a significant step in the reinvention of a nation, but also the way in which the Parliament will fit snugly into Scottish history and culture. It will be temporarily

housed in the assembly hall of the Church of Scotland, just across the road from the hall in which the last Scottish Parliament voluntarily voted itself out of existence in 1707.

And when the Parliament eventually moves into its permanent home, it will go to a site opposite Holyrood Palace—the ancient seat of Scottish monarchs—but in an adventurous modern building designed by Enric Miralles, an architect from Barcelona. The choice of a Catalan architect symbolises the growing Scottish desire to muscle on to the European stage, as Catalonia has done as a powerful region within Spain, and maybe eventually even further into the spotlight as a European nation like, say, Ireland.

If this is indeed the rebirth of a nation, it is coming about in the most extraordinary way. Save for some odd, and hapless, individuals, there have been no underground armies or even platoons of separatist terrorists; no campaigns of civil disobedience aimed at unseating governments; not even any mass demonstrations by a fed-up populace, apart from one rather genteel, well-

behaved affair seven years ago.

This has been perhaps the first revolution (how else do you describe the re-establishment of a nation's government?) that has been conducted by pen-pushing committees of lawyers, clergymen and accountants rather than cells of bearded radicals. And, unless someone cut themselves on a paper-clip, it has been achieved without a drop of blood being spilled.

So it is not surprising that this is also a revolution which—unlike that which divided Czechoslovakia—falls short of achieving full nationhood for Scotland. Parliament at Westminster, to which Scots will continue to elect MPs, will control defence and foreign affairs, macroeconomic policy, taxation and social security. The Scottish Parliament, however, will be able to make laws over health services, education, local government, housing, criminal and civil justice, and economic development. It also has limited tax powers: the ability to raise or lower basic-rate income tax by no more than 3p, and it can levy charges, such as road tolls.

### A civic nationalism

There are reasons for this semi-independent state. Unlike Québécois or Flemish nationalism, there is no language motive to Scottish nationalism; Gaelic is spoken by only about 80,000 of the 5.1m inhabitants of Scotland. Religion plays no discernible part; while the Roman Catholic minority used to fear independence as being liable to result in a Protestant hegemony, a recent MORI poll for the *Sunday Herald* found that a higher proportion of Catholics (39%) supported independence than did Protestants (32%).

And unlike East European or Balkan nationalism, the Scottish variety has very little to do with ethnicity. While there have been sporadic outbreaks of anti-English behaviour—sad stories of English families driven out of their homes, usually in small villages rather than in big cities—the Scottish National Party (SNP), which is often accused of fomenting anti-English hatred, frowns on such behaviour and expels any member who engages in it.

Alex Salmond, the SNP leader, who last wore a kilt when he was four years old, says that his party's nationalism is entirely civic in nature. "The Scots," he says, "are a mongrel nation." There are no campaigns to oust the directors of the national galleries and museum, both Englishmen, and while the fervour of the "tartan army", the followers of the national football team, is renowned, the team itself often sports players whose English accents are more noticeable than their Scottish ancestry.

## THE STATE OF SCOTLAND

Thus in Scotland today there are none of the conditions which fomented rebellion in Ireland and led to Irish independence in 1922, the last great rupture in the political union of the British Isles. Scottish nationalists do look longingly at Ireland, particularly at its phenomenal economic growth over the last decade. But for most Scots, the Irish experience does not seem to be a particularly appealing model—perhaps because it is associated in some minds with republican terrorism.

What does motivate Scottish nationalism, and has also been the driving force behind demands for devolution of power from London over the past century, is the strong Scottish attachment to the country's civic institutions. In this respect, Scotland is very different from Wales, which was forcibly incorporated into England over 400 years before the Scots signed a voluntary Act of Union in 1707. Distinctive Welsh institutions, apart from those concerned with the Welsh language, are hard to pinpoint. By contrast, Scotland's institutional landscape was well established by the time of political union with England.

These institutions—schools and universities with their own curriculum and exam structures, a legal system with its own codes and rules, a church independent of the state, a distinctive system of local government—were left untouched by the union. But they were unable to cope with the vast social change in the 19th century generated by the industrial revolution. Westminster, preoccupied with the British Empire, was unresponsive to the demands for the separate Scottish legislation needed to allow Scottish institutions to adapt to a rapidly urbanising society.

Agitation by the fast-growing middle-classes led to the establishment in 1885 of a government department dedicated to Scottish affairs—the Scottish Office—which has steadily grown in size and ministerial clout ever since. Now, its 3,650 bureaucrats manage a budget of £1.4 billion (\$22.5 billion) and another 10,081 civil servants in other agencies such as the Scottish Prison Service.

This administrative devolution might well have continued working happily had it not been for significant social and political change. First, the SNP, which had campaigned quite ineffectively since it was founded in 1928, became a significant political force when it latched on to the discovery of North Sea oil in the 1960s to argue that an independent Scotland could escape from the economic decline caused by the collapse of traditional heavy industry.

Second, the Tories steadily lost support in Scotland, going down from 31% of the vote and 22 MPs in 1979 to 18% and no MPs in 1997—and yet ran Scotland throughout that period, courtesy of their majority at Westminster. Gradually, this became seen as an affront to Scottish sensibilities, so much so that by the time of the 1997 devolution refer-

endum, Scotland's political and civic leaders (apart from the defeated Tories and a few businessmen) were pretty much united in their determination to have a Scottish parliament to handle domestic affairs. Voters were happy to follow their lead.

### Hoping for Enlightenment

The creation of a Scottish parliament should dissipate Scottish discontents, at least for the foreseeable future. But it is also propelling British politics into a new and unfamiliar decentralised political system. Westminster's writ no longer runs north of the border, at least as far as things like education and health are concerned. Equally, the Scots can no longer blame a distant government in London for all their problems.

If it works then devolution, far from being the harbinger of the break-up of Britain, should bring fresh vitality to national life



### The Scottish effect

	Scotland	Britain
Unemployment, %*	7.5	6.1
GDP per head, £	10,975	11,768
Population, m	5.1	59
Govt. spending per head, £†	4,826	4,049
Male life expectancy	72.6	74.2

\*ILO definitions, three months to Jan 1999 †Year ending Mar 1997

outside London. The new confidence in Edinburgh, which is experiencing an economic boom and basking in the media attention of the election campaign, is self-evident. The swelling number of restaurants are busy most nights even in the depths of winter, and chic fashion shops are opening in George Street, tempting citizens away from traditional navy and gaberdine garbs.

The challenges of running a country may also stimulate Scottish intellectual life. Many Scots fondly dream of a new "Scottish Enlightenment", like the one the country enjoyed in the 18th century when Scottish

thinkers like David Hume and Adam Smith were at the centre of the philosophical revolution which swept through Europe. The French philosopher Voltaire remarked, only slightly sarcastically, that if one wanted to learn anything from gardening to philosophy, one had to go to Edinburgh.

The Enlightenment was partly stimulated, some think, because political union with England ended the Scottish preoccupation with battling against its more powerful southern neighbour and opened northern eyes and minds to the possibilities, both intellectual and commercial, arising in a fast-changing world in which Britain was then playing a decisive imperial role.

Some hope that devolution, by creating a more self-reliant and confident Scotland, will provoke another intellectual flowering. Just as the Enlightenment thinkers had a strong practical bent, producing many advances in medicine for example, so too do today's Scottish scientists. The Scottish geneticists who produced Dolly, the world's first cloned sheep, are now using that biotechnology to devise new treatments for disorders such as cystic fibrosis and emphysema.

Scottish entrepreneurial spirit, which appeared to have all but died in the 1970s as many native firms succumbed to takeover or closure and as international firms closed their factories north of the border, appears to be making a comeback. Companies such as Stagecoach, built from nothing 15 years ago into a world-wide transport firm, or ScottishPower, a privatised utility now expanding into the United States, are displaying a new corporate strength and confidence. Ironically, given the vehemence of the Scottish reaction against Thatcherism, both companies grew out of Tory-inspired privatisations.

But the politicians in the Scottish Parliament will first have more mundane matters than Enlightenment to deal with. Although the Scottish economy has improved markedly—and Scotland has spent much of the past decade closing the wealth gap with the rest of Britain—the gap between rich and poor parts of the country has also increased. The economic map of Scotland, says Jeremy Peat, chief economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland, is severely lop-sided with the parts around the eastern cities of Edinburgh and Aberdeen being 60% richer than the poorest parts—west and central Scotland, the Borders and the Highlands and Islands. He says that 20 years ago the figure was only 18%.

These disparities are provoking political tensions. Glasgow, which is reeling at the prospect of losing one of its few remaining shipyards, Kvaerner Govan, and 1,800 jobs, is clamouring for departments of government to be shifted west from Edinburgh; a political party devoted only to the Highlands and Islands is contesting the elections; and politicians in the Borders are agitating for aid to deal with recent blows to the tex-

tiles and electronics industries.

There are plenty of social problems too. Graham Leicester, director of the Scottish Council Foundation, a think-tank, says that Scotland has one of the highest rates of child poverty in Europe—one in three children are growing up in households where welfare payments are the main source of income. Despite the fact that the government spends 26% more on health per head in Scotland than in England, parts of the country still have a dreadful health record. Average life expectancy in Bearsden, an affluent Glasgow suburb, is about eight years longer than in nearby Drumchapel, a district of municipal housing and high unemployment.

Tackling these matters will force Scottish politicians to admit that their traditional solution to such problems—squeezing more taxpayers' cash from the Treasury in London—is not the answer. It will also mean swallowing a bit of national pride and admitting that some prized assets, such as the widely-admired Scottish education system, are not as good as many Scots like to think. Lindsay Paterson, professor of educational policy at Edinburgh University, says that while Scotland is at the top of the European league for numbers of young people with degrees and other higher qualifications, it is towards the bottom of the league for secondary school teaching of maths and science. Facts like these have tended to be ignored as Scots have taken solace in the knowledge that at least their education system is generally better than England's. This comfort blanket should now be removed as the Scots gain control of their domestic affairs and as responsibility for failings will not be so easily passed to Westminster.



Adam Smith enlightens the Scots

## A done deal?

EDINBURGH

**O**PINION polls for the Scottish election on May 6th suggest that Labour will easily win the most seats—but will fall just short of an overall majority. That may lead to another innovation in British politics: a coalition between Labour and the Liberal Democrats.

At present both Donald Dewar, Labour's leader in Scotland, and Jim Wallace, the leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, insist that they are keeping their options open. Labour could form a minority government; the Lib Dems might do a deal with the SNP.

But careful readers of a just-published biography of Peter Mandelson, one of Tony Blair's closest advisers, may conclude that a coalition deal has already been done. The book's author, Donald Macintyre, says that a five-a-side meeting in early 1996 between senior Labourites, including Messrs Mandelson, Blair and Dewar, and senior Lib Dems, led by their leader, Paddy Ashdown, discussed the

prospect of a Scottish coalition. Mr Macintyre says that among other things, the two sides agreed that they would work towards a Lib-Lab coalition if Labour did not have an overall majority, or had an unworkably small one.

When quizzed about this by *The Economist*, Mr Dewar neither confirmed nor denied that the meeting took place, but insisted that he has no deal with the Lib Dems. Mr Wallace of the Lib Dems says the same thing—but he is already making his coalition negotiating stance known. He says, for example, that he may drop his opposition to Labour's policy of charging students tuition fees.

A Lib-Lab coalition in Scotland would be a handy pilot project for Mr Blair, whose "project" is often said to revolve around the idea of fusing Labour and the Lib Dems into an unbeatable centre-left force. Having a working model in Labour's Scottish heartlands would help him sell the plan to his party.

It is often predicted that this new political world will cause problems in England. After all, Scottish MPs will continue to vote on English domestic affairs while English MPs will have no comparable say in Scottish affairs. Just as the Scots throughout the 1980s lamented being governed by English politicians they had not elected, so the English—in time—may resent the Scottish say over their affairs. But this anomaly, the so-called "West Lothian question", may cause less irritation than is assumed, for two reasons.

First, Tony Blair's government would still have a thumping majority even if there were no Scottish or even Welsh MPs at Westminster. True, the time may come when England votes for a Tory government but does not get it because of Scottish Labour MPs. But then, second, it is not true that Scottish and English affairs are now completely separate. Because of the way the Treasury's block grant to the Scottish Parliament is determined, when Westminster MPs vote on changes to the English health and education budgets, they will also be determining changes to the Scottish budget.

That gives English MPs a say in Scottish business, and Scottish MPs an acute interest in English matters. Indeed this intertwining may eventually cause a political headache if, say, the British government decides it wants to switch from the present tax-financed health service to one more dependent on revenue from private health insurance, but the Scottish Parliament stubbornly refuses to contemplate such a move.

However, such a policy change seems

unlikely, at least in the medium term. And in the meantime, both parliaments and the British taxpayer ought to benefit from greater policy experimentation and variety of experience. The introduction, for example, of a General Teaching Council to regulate the English teaching profession follows the experience of a similar long-established and Scottish body which has helped to raise standards in teacher training. More such learning and borrowing ought to be possible.

Indeed, while some feared that the newly elected parliament in Edinburgh would spend its time arguing for yet more power to be passed from Westminster, so far at least such arguments have been absent from the election campaign. Even the SNP, much attacked by opponents as separatists, have concentrated on domestic policy issues. The dawn of complete Scottish independence, far from having been brought closer, seems to be as far away as ever. The SNP remain isolated advocates of it, and until Scotland's powerful civic institutions see something better in independence than they currently get from the union with England, they are unlikely to be lured into the Nationalist fold.

Instead, what seems to be arising is a different Scotland, and a different Britain. Britain's centralised political culture will be changed, probably irreversibly. It will be replaced by a more diverse sort of politics, in which different regional and national identities will be given new encouragement and expression. They may even co-operate, rather than clash.

## **Tony Blair: Speech to the Scottish Parliament 9 March 2000**

Some believe the programme of decentralisation and devolution is wrong. I disagree profoundly. You do not judge these changes in days or months, or even a short space of years. You judge them in the broad sweep of history. There is an historical movement away from centralised government. As democracy matures, so does the desire of the electorate for decisions to be taken closer to them. So does the desire for diversity. When people point to differences in devolved policy and ask me, "isn't this a problem?", my response is that it is devolution. Not an accident. But the intention.

Other people mistakenly say it represents the end of Britain. The truth is quite the opposite. Our identity as Britain is a matter of our values and our interests. It is not about fossilizing institutions and refusing to change them.

Indeed it would be failure to modernise that would lead to the end of Britain. That is why this Government is bringing our constitution up to date. To make sure that it does give effect to our continuing values in fast changing circumstances.

Britain's values and interests are enduring. They have grown up from our history and our shared experience. They reflect the shared experience of countries coming together in common interest to form a diverse but strong union. These values are deep rooted and powerful. They bind together Scotland and the rest of Britain. They are expressed in the partnership which we are forging today between the Scottish Parliament and the United Kingdom Parliament.

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That is why I stand before you today, deeply conscious of the historical significance of this occasion. Our country is changing. The institutions of the 19th Century will not serve us in the 21st.

Ours is a union that is evolving. We see it in our relations with Europe. We see it in the creation of a Welsh Assembly. We see it in the popular will yearning for devolved government in Northern Ireland. We see it in the strengthening of local identity in the regions of England. And perhaps most of all, we see and feel it here in this Scottish Parliament.

When they locked the doors of the old Scottish Parliament nearly three hundred years ago, they said it was "the end of an auld sang". I am here to celebrate with you the beginning of a new one, and of a new era of partnership within the United Kingdom.