CORRECTION DU DEVOIR SUR TABLE DE DECEMBRE 2011
Passage de Reflections on the Revolution in France de Edmund Burke
Burke, as
always in the book, criticizes Richard Price and the members of the
Revolution Society (whose name was in honour of the Glorious Revolution
of 1688 and not of the French Revolution, although members of the
Revolution Society were admirers of the French Revolution).
In
this passage, Burke criticizes the fact that the men of the Revolution
Society feel that “the rights of men” are enough as a basis for a
constitutional order. One does not need the lessons drawn from the past
(the “test of long experience” 3). Indeed, according to the Revolution
Society, the rights of men should be the only basis of any
Constitution. And since some aspects of the British Constitution are at
variance with the principles of the rights of men (8-10), as defined by
the French revolutionaries, the Revolution Society, Burke implies,
would like to change the British Constitution, no matter how ancient or
successful it may be (7-9).
Burke objects to basing the
constitutional order on the rights of men. Not because he does not want
men to have basic rights, but because the rights of men are an abstract
notion (which is why he calls the members of the Revolution Society
“speculatists” engaging in “political metaphysics”) that does not carry
with it the guarantee that a constitutional order based on the rights
of men in theory will enable citizens to enjoy basic human rights in
practice.
In Burke’s view, when it comes to making sure
that the people’s rights are preserved, only the practical method of
procuring and preserving those rights should be considered. Theories
have no power to enforce themselves. (This is the meaning of lines
12-15).
A commonwealth is a complex construct, for Burke. It
is so complex that no one can confidently say that they fully
understand what consequences any political action may have. Only time
reveals what kind of constitutional construct is profitable (or
damageable) for the commonwealth (17-21). This is why Burke says that
“the science of constructing a commonwealth ... [is] not to be taught a priori. It is only a posteriori,
with the passing of time (and a long time, too! see lines 26-27), that
one can say which constitutional arrangements works and which ones do
not. Experience over several generations is therefore more important
that theory when it comes to judging the worth of a particular
Constitution and its capacity to guarantee the rights of the people.
The
British Constitution has been around for centuries and it “has answered
… the common purposes of society” (28-29) to a “tolerable degree” (29).
It may have flaws, but experience shows that it works and on the whole
has been successful in preserving the people’s rights. Who can say with
certainty, Burke implies, that a constitution based on the theory of
the rights of men will be more successful in practice that the British
Constitution has been? This is why Burke advises “caution” (28) before
one starts “pulling down” a constitutional order that has stood the
test of time.
It was important for students to see that
Burke was not against the rights of men. And he does not say that a
constitutional order based on the rights of men is bound to be bad. He
simply says that there is no guarantee that such a constitutional order
would be better than what Britain already has and that it may well be
worse: “very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have
often shameful and lamentable conclusions”. Since the British
Constitution, whatever its flaws, has been working tolerably well, one
would do better to keep it rather than pull it down and put in its
place something that may end up being far worse.
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